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CROSS-CULTURAL LAWYERING
BY THE BOOK:
THE LATEST CLINICAL TEXTS AND A
SKETCH OF A FUTURE AGENDA
ASCANIO PIOMELLI*

Introduction
In 1997, Michelle Jacobs forcefully argued that the leading
clinical textbooks of the era, despite advocating a client-centered
approach to law practice, failed to address the potential impact of
cultural differences on the interactions between attorneys and
clients - a failing that impaired the representation of clients of color
and lower-income clients.1 She urged lawyers (and clinical teachers)
* Associate Clinical Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of
the Law, Civil Justice Clinic. I thank Annie Miyazaki, Donna Ryu, Eumi Lee, Mark
Aaronson, Michelle Fei, Miye Goishi, Muneer Ahmad, Patti Chang, Shauna Marshall,
and Stacey Strongarone for reading earlier drafts and sharing wise suggestions.
1. See Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in ClientCentered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 345 (1997). The texts she critiqued were
ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBOUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING AND
NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990); DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL
BERGMAN & SUSAN PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1991) [hereinafter BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 1]. Jacobs exposed these
texts' failure to mention, let alone attend to, the challenges inherent in cross-racial
and/or cross-class interactions between attorneys and clients. See Jacobs, supra, at 346-47.
She discussed how Binder and his colleagues acknowledged that the client-centered
approach might not work with "atypical or difficult client[s]," i.e., those who are
reluctant to participate in discussions, hostile, and/or inappropriately lacking in concern
for the gravity of the issues they face. See id. at 353-61 (discussing BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS I, supra, at 237-56). Jacobs warned that the ranks of such
"difficult" clients were likely to be disproportionately populated by people of color and
lower-income and working-class clients, because lawyers' unconscious racism and/or
classism - if left unexamined and unchecked by explicit training - might predispose
them to see such clients as embodying the characteristics the texts defined as "atypical or
difficult." See id. Her critique revealed the danger of failing to explicitly explore crosscultural difference and to prepare student-lawyers to navigate it effectively.
For an important, earlier critique of the client-centered model's failure to address
[131]
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to pursue cross-cultural training to explore the impact of their own
2
race and class on their interactions with clients.
In the decade since Jacobs' article, many clinicians have written
thoughtfully about how students and attorneys might best prepare
to work effectively with clients across dimensions of cultural
difference - such as race, ethnicity, nationality, class, gender, sexual
orientation, etc. 3 Sue Bryant and Jean Koh Peters, who outline five
key habits for lawyers to develop to attain cross-cultural
effectiveness, have been particularly insightful. 4 Spurred in part by

issues of difference, such as power, race, gender, class, and age, see Ann Shalleck,
Constructions of the Client within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1742-48 (1993).
2. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 361, 377-84, 395, 404-11. As she summarized her
criticism of the client-centered model:
The student/lawyer is not trained to reflect inwardly when probing,
empathizing and listening to the client. She is not alerted to the possibilities of
her own culpability when the communication dynamic fails. The student/
lawyer is set up to conclude, prematurely and frequently erroneously at the
initial interview stage[,] that the clients have some pathology. Never is she
attuned to engage in critical self-reflection to determine whether some
deficiency within her own understanding prohibits her from establishing
rapport from the client. So long as we have not trained the student/lawyer to
engage in critical self-reflection of this nature, we continue to train lawyers to
engage in privileged decision-making without reference to the bottom and by
so doing subvert the goals of client-centered counseling.
Id. at 361 (footnote omitted).
3. See, e.g., Jane Harris Aiken, Striving to Teach Justice, Fairness and Morality, 4
CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (1997) (characterizing recognition of power and privilege as central to
doing justice); Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in
Lawyering, 8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33 (2001) (describing approach developed with Jean Koh
Peters); Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999); Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence,
Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3 FL. COASTAL L.J. 219 (2002); Paul R. Tremblay,
Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 373
(2002) (proposing use of heuristics, i.e., tentative generalizations, concerning areas in
which standard client-centered model may not fit clients from diverse cultures, while
also urging lawyers to develop self-awareness of their own cultural backgrounds and
biases); Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: Teaching Psychology to Develop Cultural
Self-Awareness, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2005). See also Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal
Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95
MICH. L. REV. 901 (1997) (advocating race-sensitive, rather than colorblind, approach to
lawyering, with appropriate training to practice it); Russell G. Pearce, White Lawyering:
Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule of Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2005).
4. Bryant and Koh Peters' "Five Habits" entail: (1) identifying areas of similarity
and difference between lawyer and client (and reflecting on their potential significance
for the relationship); (2) identifying areas of similarity and difference between the client
and legal system and between the attorney and legal system; (3) brainstorming multiple
alternative explanations for client conduct; (4) anticipating and planning for potentially
problematic aspects of cross-cultural communication; and (5) becoming nonjudgmentally aware of one's own biases and stereotypes and learning to detect and
minimize their impact on interactions. See Bryant, supra note 3, at 64-78.

Fall 20061

CROSS-CULTURAL LAWYERING BY THE BOOK

Jacobs and the burgeoning literature she prompted, a new
generation of clinical textbooks on interviewing and counseling
have recognized the importance of preparing student-lawyers to
5
interact with clients from whom they culturally differ.
The importance of training lawyers to become cross-culturally
adept is likely self-evident to readers of this journal, as it generally is
now in the literature on progressive lawyering and clinical
education. In the heterogeneous and stratified society in which we
live, race, class, gender, national origin, language, immigration
status, sexual orientation, religion, and a host of other differences
between us continue to have real significance. Benefits and burdens
are allocated in significant part - sometimes consciously, sometimes
not - along many of these dimensions of difference. Groups often
have (and remember) collective histories of difficult interactions
with members of other groups. The experiences and identities that
we share with some people and that distinguish us from others
often - but not invariably or uniformly - shape us in important
ways. They can dispose each of us to interact more easily with some
people and to feel more distant toward or likely to be
misunderstood, or even harmed, by others.
Given the central role our society assigns lawyers to help
pursue and resolve disputes and to facilitate interactions, it is
imperative that lawyers be able to work effectively with all clients those who are (or seem) quite similar and those from whom they
differ. Indeed, our success as a democratic society depends upon the
ability of members of all groups to receive and deliver effective
assistance. Failure to train lawyers in cross-cultural interaction
threatens to perpetuate the exclusion or marginalization from the
legal system and profession that many people of color, people from
low-income and working-class backgrounds, and members of other
subordinated groups sometimes experience - as clients or attorneys.
Part I of this essay discusses how the latest clinical textbooks
prepare students for cross-cultural work. (This is the sole dimension
along which it assesses the texts.) The essay highlights differences in
5. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II]; ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., JOHN M.A.
DIPIPPA & MARTHA M. PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH

TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1999) [hereinafter COCHRAN Er AL., THE
COUNSELOR-AT-LAW I]; ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA & MARTHA M.
PETERS, THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW:
A
COLLABORATIVE
APPROACH TO CLIENT

INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter COCHRAN ET AL., THE
COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II]; STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL
LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, NEGOTIATION, COUNSELING, AND PERSUASIVE FACT
ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS

IIl.
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how broadly or narrowly the textbooks define culture, its sources,
and the measure of cross-cultural success, how they describe the
dimensions along which cultures differ, on which side(s) of the
lawyer-client relationship they focus, and the behaviors they
suggest. It argues these texts are at their best when they employ a
broad definition of culture and its wellsprings, when they evenhandedly describe the ways in which people and cultures can differ,
and when they pay astute attention both to what we as lawyers
should learn about others and to what we must learn about ourselves,
our culture(s), and our reactions to and interactions with others.
These and other cross-cultural materials are at their best, in
short, when they spark generous curiosity, nurture engaged, nonjudgmental inquiry, and foster real connection with others. A central
challenge is to encourage constructive attention to the influence that
culture has, without implying that its influence is total, i.e., without
reducing anyone to a simple cardboard cutout or generic product of
her or his culture. 6 The appropriate measure of success is the extent
to which our attention and understanding are broadened to
appreciate multiple facets of people, rather than narrowed to focus
only on a few aspects or cultural "rules of thumb." Taken seriously,
this is part of a lifetime's work of improving our ability to work
with others (and to understand ourselves). Textbooks are but one
resource, from among many upon which we can draw, to prepare
7
ourselves for this work.
Part II sketches an agenda for further exploration of crosscultural issues that neither the latest textbooks nor the broader
clinical lawyering literature have fully addressed. It suggests that to
better prepare student-lawyers to work with diverse clients particularly those served by most law school clinics - we need to
focus more specific attention on socioeconomic class and its cultural
manifestations. It also proposes exploring in greater depth the latest
studies on social cognition and subconscious social attitudes.
Finally, it suggests attending to the potentially destructive interplay
of lawyers' professional socialization and prevailing stereotypes of
low-income and working-class people.
Culture is, of course, a notoriously difficult term to define.
Several disciplines, such as cultural anthropology and sociology, are
devoted in part to the task and deeply divided in the effort. 8 Despite
6. See, e.g., TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEA OF CULTURE 28 (2000) (describing notions of
culture as destiny).
7. Part I.D. infra, for example, describes many of the ways in which my colleagues
and I at the Hastings Civil Justice Clinic attempt to infuse cross-cultural issues
throughout the curriculum of our Individual Representation Clinic. See infra notes 152,
161-67 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., EAGLETON, supra note 6; A.L. KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE:
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the difficulty of the challenge, and the likely imperfection of the
result, it nonetheless seems essential to try to define the term. As
used in this essay, "culture" denotes those ways of approaching,
understanding, and acting in the world that are widely (but not
necessarily universally) shared by members of a social group - and
are often hotly contested by some group members. 9 Culture is
consequently something we all have, not simply a marker of people
whom we define as "other." 10 Indeed, given the multiplicity of
social groups to which we each belong, we belong as well
(comfortably or not) to multiple cultures - some of which we
choose, some to which others assign us. For those of us engaged in
social-change efforts, much of what we do can be understood as an
effort to contest and redefine what it means to be a member of our
cultures (whether chosen or ascribed). One might thus analogize
culture to a current that we and other members of our social
group(s) move with, or against, and occasionally even redirect, as
we strive to make sense of and act in the world. 1

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS (1952); ADAM KUPER, CULTURE: THE
ANTHROPOLOGISTS' ACCOUNT (1999).

9. These approaches to making sense of and acting in the world are typically
passed on, some explicitly, some tacitly, to new members of the group.
10. Cf.Fredric Jameson, On "Cultural Studies," 34 SOCIAL TEXT 17, 34 (1993) (culture
as "an idea of the Other") (quoted in EAGLETON, supra note 6, at 26); RENATO ROSALDO,
CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 198 (1989) ("In 'our' own

eyes, 'we' appear to be 'people without culture.' By courtesy, 'we' extend this
noncultural status to people who ('we' think) resemble 'us."') (quoted in Martha R.
Mahoney, Segregation,Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1664 n.18
(1995)).
11. Without seeking to model the appropriate parameters of cultural description, nor
to cast culture as entirely a matter of self-description, nor to imply that it is neatly
encapsulable in a single paragraph, I nonetheless consider it important to acknowledge
some of my cultural influences. I am a White, male, clinical law professor in my forties. I
am the oldest of two children of Italian, leftist parents who imnmigrated to the U.S. and
became professors of medicine and architecture. I attended prestigious schools: a
private, all-male elementary and middle school; a public, magnet high school; and an
elite university for college and law school. An ex-New Yorker, raised in Greenwich
Village and SoHo, I am now a long-time San Franciscan. I am married to a ChineseAmerican woman from working-class origins, who has a graduate degree and manages
a non-profit community development organization. We have a Chinese daughter. As a
lawyer, I have worked primarily with low-income and working-class clients in Fresno,
East Palo Alto, and the Bay Area. I identify as a progressive lawyer and teacher
committed to working (and encouraging students to work) with, rather than for, clients
and communities to make social change. See Ascanio Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative
Lawyering, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 427 (2000); Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault'sApproach to Power:
Its Allure and Limits for Collaborative Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L.REV. 395, 417; Ascanio
Piomelli, The DemocraticRoots of CollaborativeLawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541 (2006).
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I. Approaches of Recent Clinical Textbooks
In the years since Jacobs' article, five new clinical textbooks (or
revised editions of older ones) on interviewing and counseling have
been published. 12 Three of these texts directly address cross-cultural
interactions between lawyers and clients. 13 In so doing, these three
texts have decisively rejected the culture-blind approach to teaching
interviewing and counseling that previously prevailed. After
critically analyzing the approach of the dominant text at some
length, this essay explores the distinctive aspects of its two less-wellknown competitors, omitting areas in which the texts are essentially
similar.

A. The Dominant Text: Binder, Bergman, Price and Tremblay's
Lawyers as Counselors
For the past three decades, David Binder and his collaborators
have dominated the field of clinical textbooks on interviewing and
counseling. 14 In 1977, Binder and Susan Price, in Legal Interviewing
and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach,15 introduced the legal
community to the notion of client-centered lawyering - with its
emphasis on client autonomy and on ensuring that clients make key
decisions based on their values and priorities. 16 By 1991, when
Binder and Price joined with Paul Bergman to publish Lawyers as
Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach,17 client-centered lawyering
had become the dominant paradigm taught in almost every clinical
program in the United States. 18 Binder and his co-authors' influence
12. In addition to the texts cited supra at note 5, see DAVID F. CHAVKIN, CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUCATION: A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOL CLINICAL PROGRAMS (2002); THOMAS
L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. ELKINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL

(4th ed. 2005).
13. Neither CHAVKIN, supra note 12, nor SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 12, address
the issue.
14. A LEXIS search of U.S. and Canadian law reviews conducted on Sep. 16, 2006,
returned, for the years (since 1999) when editions of all three texts have been in print,
159 citations to editions of Lawyers as Counselors, compared with 33 references to editions
of Essential Lawyering Skills and 39 citations to The Counselor-at-Law.
15. DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A
CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977).

16. For an excellent discussion of the different domains of autonomy that clientcenteredness can be seen as protecting, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The
Plural Values of Client-CenteredRepresentation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006).
17. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS I, supra note 1.

18. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 504 (1990) (characterizing client-centered model as
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cannot be overstated; they revolutionized the way lawyering is
analyzed, taught, and assessed. As a fellow legal clinician noted,
"we are all client-centered lawyers now" - even if we each aspire to
our own version of that ideal. 19
In 2004, Binder, Bergman, and Price joined with Paul Tremblay
to publish a second edition of Lawyers as Counselors.20 Tremblay's
own work on the need to modify aspects of the client-centered
model to better fit clients from non-dominant cultures, 21 and Jacobs'
detailed critique of the previous edition, 22 augured well for how the
new edition might address cross-cultural issues. The revised text
does constitute an important step forward. But, as detailed below, it
does not incorporate or acknowledge as many of Tremblay's and
Jacobs' insights as it might have - in large part because it remains so
intently focused on the client's culture that it directs little or no
attention to the lawyer and the potential impact of her 23 culture(s),
24
assumptions, attitudes, or behavior.
"primary influence" on clinical law professors and indicating 94 law schools had
adopted initial edition of Binder & Price's textbook).
19. The comment was made by Professor Stephen Ellman at the ceremony bestowing
on David Binder the 2006 William Pincus Award for outstanding contribution to clinical
legal education. Given Binder's formative and lasting imprint on the field, his
recognition by the Clinical Section of the American Association of Law Schools was long
overdue, as the Award has been given annually since 1981,
see
http://www.cleaweb.org/awards/pincus.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2006).
20. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5.

21. See Tremblay, supra note 3.
22. See Jacobs, supra note 1.
23. To reflect the gender diversity among lawyers and clients, the gender of
pronouns shall alternate from paragraph to paragraph.
24. This failing is doubly disappointing. For one, Jacobs' critique explicitly and
repeatedly identified the need to broaden the scope of attention. She wrote: "We cannot
move forward if we are examining only one-half, the client half, of the problem of the
lawyer-client dynamic." Jacobs, supra note 1, at 407. The text's inattention to the lawyer
side of the relation is further disappointing because Tremblay addressed it directly (and
repeatedly) in his article too. He wrote, for example:
I note the importance for any lawyer of understanding his or her cultural
identity, including biases, stereotypes, values, and comfort patterns. The
sophisticated writers about cross-culture counseling help us understand that no
lawyer enters into an attorney-client relationship without a complex package of
learned behaviors, assumptions, and biases. Understanding your complex
package and identifying its components explicitly is a critical step in becoming
a better cross-cultural lawyer.
Tremblay, supra note 3, at 384. Unfortunately, his co-authors did not follow up on his
insight.
At one point the textbook does note the importance of "understanding your own
core values." See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 36. But

values are only one aspect of culture that warrants scrutiny; one can attend to one's
values and still miss key elements of one's assumptions, attitudes, traditions, comfort
zones, and behavior.
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Initial Framing:An Issue of Motivation and Participation

Lawyers as Counselors' primary discussion of "inter-cultural
difference" occurs in its chapter on motivation, in a nine-page sub25 It
section entitled "Motivation in Inter-Cultural Contexts."
describes itself as examining "common dimensions of inter-cultural
difference that might inhibit active client participation in the
interviewing and counseling process" and suggesting "how you
might respond should you believe that such differences are
26
inhibiting clients' participation."
The text does not explicitly define what it means by "culture"
or "inter-cultural difference." But it is clear from its discussion of the
United States as a "multi-ethnic society" and its presentation of
common dimensions of intercultural difference, that the text
primarily understands culture as a function or product of ethnicity based primarily on national origin and perhaps race - and
sometimes geographic region. 27 It makes no reference to class or
professional socialization as important sources of culture that might
28
have significance for lawyering.
The initial framing of inter-cultural difference as an issue of
motivation to participate is unfortunate for several reasons. For one,
it presents the issue as essentially a volitional matter: Is a client
motivated or not to participate in his case? Attention is focused
primarily on the client and his culture. To the extent that motivation
is understood as an inner drive or spark, its absence will be seen by
many as an internal failing of the client. Such a framing will likely
encourage some students and attorneys - particularly those already
prone to perceiving low-income and working-class clients as
uninterested, lackadaisical, or uncommitted to bettering their

25. See BINDER Er AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 32-40.

26. Id. at 32.
27. Only two examples used in this subchapter of the text explicitly identify specific

cultural backgrounds of the participants. One involves a New York lawyer and a client
from North Carolina. Id. at 33. The other involves a client who grew up in China. Id. at
39-40. No additional cultural markers are provided. (It should be noted, however, that in

each example, the text invites the reader to put herself in the position of the lawyer, so
perhaps the expectation is that the reader will supply missing cultural markers).
28. As detailed infra in Parts II.A and II.C, the failure to attend to socioeconomic
class and lawyers' professional socialization are significant omissions. Binder and his
colleagues do at one point discuss gender, by raising the possibility that some women
might be reluctant to discuss certain issues with male attorneys, see id. at 38, but the
context of the discussion seems to paint the issue as particular to certain national or
ethnic cultures.
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situation 29 - to understand the issue as a deliberate choice their
clients make. Without disagreeing that clients may sometimes
willfully disengage, perhaps as a form of resistance to their attorney,
there is a cost to assuming this is always true. Framing the issue as
one of client volition, in which clients decide whether to engage
with the lawyer or to deliberately withhold their participation, is not
likely to discourage students from putting the onus for a successful
relationship on clients.
Even though previous sections of this chapter on motivation
discussed
a number
of facilitators
and inhibitors of
communication, 30 and placed some of the burden on lawyers to
motivate their clients to participate fully, 31 students who most need
help in understanding and accepting this burden will likely require
more explicit encouragement. Phrasing the lawyer's task as
"facilitating," "encouraging," "inviting," or "enabling" client
participation (rather than "motivating" it) might better convey the
lawyer's at-least-co-equal responsibility - and would not connote
that a lack of client participation indicates a failing on her client's
part. Another way of conveying the attorney's important role and
influence in this regard could be to list the attorney's culture - and
especially her inability to see or get beyond it - as an additional
possible inhibitor of client participation.32 Alternatively or
additionally, "cross-cultural openness" could be included as an
additional facilitator. Unfortunately, the text takes none of those
routes.
Indeed, at times one gets the impression that the authors place
29. Indeed, a phenomenon that seems to pervade law school clinics throughout the
U.S. (at least based on anecdotal reports by clinicians) is the frequently voiced complaint
from students that "my client doesn't take her case nearly as seriously as I do." See, e.g.,
Jacobs, supra note 1, at 382; Tremblay, supra note 3, at 395. See also infra at notes 216-17
and accompanying text (on prevalent stereotypes of lower-income and working-class
people).
30. Inhibitors include ego threat, case threat, role expectations, etiquette barriers,
trauma, perceived irrelevancy, and greater need. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 19-26. Facilitators include empathic understanding,
fulfilling expectations, recognition, altruistic appeals, and extrinsic reward. See id. at 2631.

31. The text states: "client-centered counseling suggests that you take reasonable
steps to motivate all clients to participate actively in the problem-solving process." Id. at
39. The key issue, of course, is how broadly or narrowly students and attorneys interpret
the term "reasonable."
32. Jacobs essentially suggested such an addition in her critique of the text's first
edition. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 356-357 (noting that "[tihe issue of student/lawyer
based inhibitors is not raised," and that "if the inhibiting factor is the race of the lawyer,
and/or the lawyer's expectations regarding the client and the client's culture,
knowledge of the facilitators will not provide the lawyer with the tools to break through
the barrier.").
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almost exclusive attention on the client's culture and how it may
lead him not to participate or engage with the attorney. The text also
seems implicitly to presume that attorneys are from dominant social
backgrounds - an assumption that is not only inaccurate, but also
serves to compound the invisibility or marginalization that many
students or lawyers of color or from low-income and working-class
backgrounds feel from the legal profession. Although the text
typically uses the term "cultural difference," it never explicitly
describes difference as a relational concept - in which an attorney
and client are equally different from each other. 33 Instead, it seems
to cast cultural difference as a feature or trait of the client or his
culture, treating difference as deviation from an assumed, but
unarticulated, mainstream norm.
"For example," the authors write, "clients' cultural traditions
may inhibit participation by leaving them uncertain about how open
they should be during counseling when they are asked to express
their concerns." 34 Implicit is the notion that the appropriate norm is
to be completely open and that 'lack of openness to expressing
concerns' is a quirk of certain cultures. If one were truly to treat
difference as relational, one would likely urge the attorney in such a
situation to push herself to attend to potential nonverbal or
indirectly phrased signs of concern, rather than pressing clients to
directly and explicitly express them.
Another example is the statement: "If you cannot assume that
cultures are stable and that clients' values and practices are
consistent with their cultural backgrounds, neither can you be
oblivious to the potential for inter-cultural differences to affect
33. Perhaps the classic explication in the legal literature of difference as a relational
concept is Martha Minow's. As she explained almost two decades ago:
"Difference" is only meaningful as a comparison. I am no more different from
you than you are from me. A short person is different only in relation to a tall
one. Legal treatment of difference tends to take for granted an assumed point of
comparison: women are compared to the unstated norm of men, "minority"
Such assumptions
races to Whites, handicapped persons to the able-bodied ....
work in part through the very structure of our language, which embeds the
unstated points of comparison inside categories that bury their perspective and
wrongly imply a natural fit with the world. The term "working mother,"
modifies the general category "mother," revealing that the general term carries
some unstated common meanings (that is, a woman who cares for her children
full-time without pay), which, even if unintended, must expressly be modified.
Legal treatment of difference thus tends to treat as unproblematic the point of
view from which difference is seen, assigned, or ignored, rather than
acknowledging that the problem of difference can be described and understood
from multiple points of view.
Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term - Foreword:Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 10, 13-14 (1987).
34. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II,
supra note 5, at 32.

Fall 2006]

CROSS-CULTURAL LAWYERING BY THE BOOK

clients' thinking and behavior." 35 Again, the text focuses on how
"inter-cultural differences... affect clients' thinking and behavior,"
without discussing how those differences affect attorneys' thinking
and behavior. The problem of inter-cultural difference, in such a
framing, becomes an attribute of the client and his culture, rather
than the gap between the client's culture and the lawyer's, or the
way that the lawyer perceives and interacts with his client's trait(s).
This framing fails to portray inter-cultural problems as a two-way
dynamic in which lawyer and client are equally different from each
other and thus each must struggle to communicate (and work
together) effectively.
Limiting attention to client participation ignores the attorney's
reaction to her client's participation. The issue in a cross-cultural
interaction is not just client participation (in sharing information
and making decisions) but also accurate understanding by the
lawyer of the client's goals with regards to the outcomes sought and
the methods used to pursue them. The success of an attorney-client
relationship cannot adequately be assessed simply by looking at
whether the client speaks and chooses from among the options her
lawyer suggests. Assessment requires an examination of what the
attorney actually hears (and perceives), what she conveys (both
verbally and non-verbally) to her client, and how congruent her
actions are with her client's intentions, desires, values, and
36
interests.
The text directs students' and lawyers' gaze outward toward
their clients' cultures, without also directing it inward toward their
own culture, assumptions, and reactions. 37 Its strategies for
35. Id.
at 34.
36. Sue Bryant, making a similar point, characterizes the aim of cross-cultural
training as to make "isomorphic attributions, i.e., to attribute to behavior and

communication that which is intended by the actor or speaker." Bryant, supra note 3, at
42-43, 56.
37. Binder and his colleagues' exclusive focus on clients in this regard is puzzling

given that Tremblay, who helped revise the text, clearly emphasized the importance of
closely examining oneself and one's own culture in his earlier article on heuristics and

biases in cross-cultural lawyering. See Tremblay, supra note 3. In addition to the passage
quoted supra at note 24, Tremblay explained that he introduced his second key concept
of "bias" to
turn[] the focus back on you, on your cultural presuppositions, and on the
distortions and prejudices you bring to the client interaction. Not only do you
need to know something about how different cultures might respect different
values, customs and practices, but you also must "move[] from being culturally
unaware to being aware and sensitive to [your] own cultural issues and to the
ways that [your] own values and biases affect culturally diverse clients."

Id. at 386 (quoting Donald B. Pope-Davis & Jonathan G. Dings, The Assessment of
Multicultural Counseling Competencies, in HANDBOOK OF MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING
287, 287-88 (Joseph G. Ponterotto et al. eds., 1995)). Indeed, Tremblay identified "the
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addressing cross-cultural challenges depend upon the lawyer's
recognition of a possible cross-cultural problem. In its own words, it
"offers suggestions for how you might respond should you believe
that such differences are inhibiting clients' participation." 38 But, as
many have remarked, it is often difficult for people, especially those
who fit comfortably within the dominant culture of a society, to
even recognize the possibility of other legitimate ways of
39
considering or structuring reality.
2.

Stereotyping

Lawyers as Counselors opens its discussion of inter-cultural
difference by warning of the dangers of stereotyping, which it
defines as ascribing presumed attitudes and behaviors to members
of other groups. 40 It cautions that efforts to bridge intercultural
differences pose a danger of stereotyping, especially if one makes
assumptions about "the values and practices associated with a
particular cultural heritage" or assumes that a particular person
41
with that heritage shares the traits ascribed to that culture.
Consequently, the text wisely urges that all assertions regarding
"cultural differences" be understood as "tentative," for cultures
reflect a "continuum of values," with core or mainstream values
lying at the mean of a normal distribution (i.e., bell-shaped curve) of
42
the population of that culture.
most central message" of multicultural counseling scholarship as "the need for
counselors, including lawyers, to confront their own cultural identity, including the
biases and prejudices that accompany that identity...." Id. at 415-16. It is a shame his
co-authors and he opted not to include and elaborate on this important insight.
38. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 32.
39. See, e.g., Aiken, supra note 3, at 17-18 ("We do not experience the messages we
receive culturally as explicit lessons. Instead we perceive them merely as the way things
are.... [Glenerally, when privilege is exercised, the person is unaware of the role such
privilege plays in perpetuating systematic oppression."); Minow, supra note 33, at 73-74
("more powerful" people have difficulty recognizing that "the world coincides with
[their] view precisely because [they] shaped it in accordance with those views," while
"the more marginal" are "more likely.., to glimpse a contrast between some people's
perceptions of reality and ... [their] own.").
40. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 32-33.
41. Id. at 33.
42. Id. at 33-34. This usage of "cultural differences" seems again to indicate that the
authors view "differences," "heritages," and "traits" as synonyms, i.e., that they are not
using "difference" as a relational concept to describe a gap or relationship between two
parties, so much as they are describing a trait of just one of those parties, whom they
treat as "other." See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
The presumption of a bell-shaped curve seems to assume that the dominance of
certain traits or norms maps neatly with population size, i.e., that numerical majorities
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All of these points are well taken. Stereotyping certainly is an
evil to avoid and the struggle to refrain from ascribing presumed
attitudes and traits to members of other groups and cultures is an
essential one to wage. But it is not clear that the text offers much
guidance in how to avoid stereotyping, other than 'just saying no' to
non-tentative assumptions about others' beliefs or behaviors. It does
not, for example, urge us to verbalize our (and our culture's)
assumptions about members of the group(s) to which our client may
belong, so that we can compare how closely our observations
comport with those expectations. Nor does it suggest that we
articulate how the cultures involved in a case (the legal culture and
those of key players) are likely to perceive or label the client or her
story - for lawyers are not the only actors who may stereotype the
43
client.
Moreover, framing the central danger as stereotyping - when
stereotyping is understood as the conscious ascription of traits and
predilections to groups - seems again to cast cross-cultural
interactions as completely volitional, as a matter of what we choose
to believe or assume about others. One certainly ought never
downplay the degree of will it takes to consciously monitor and
change one's cross-cultural assumptions and skills. But, as Part II.B
of this Essay discusses, attention to guarding simply against
conscious stereotyping ignores the extensive body of research on
social cognition that explores the significant unconscious
dimensions of cross-cultural misunderstanding and antagonism. 44
3.

Dimensions of InterculturalDifference
Drawing heavily from the work of Dutch sociologist Geert

define what becomes a cultural norm. I find such an assumption unsound, because I
believe dominant groups or elites (who often comprise a minority of a population) tend
to set cultural norms. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
43. Binder, Bergman, and their colleague Albert Moore do make a closely related
suggestion in their text on trial advocacy, in which they urge lawyers to recognize and
explicitly address "silent arguments" which may be influencing fact-finders, but are not
voiced by them. See DAVID A. BINDER, ALBERT J.MOORE & PAUL B. BERGMAN, TRIAL
ADVOCACY: INFERENCES, ARGUMENTS AND TECHNIQUES 80-86 (1996).

44. See infra notes 190-214 and accompanying text. For one of the earliest discussions
of social cognition research in the legal literature, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186-1217 (1995). For an earlier
argument, based in Freudian psychology, on the unconsciousness of much modem
racism, see Charles R. Lawrence II1, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
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Hofstede, 45 Binder and his colleagues detail six key dimensions of
intercultural difference. 46 Hofstede, who defines culture as "the
collective programming of the mind which distinguishes one human
group from another," is a firm believer that national cultures exist
and matter. 47 Narrowly focused on nationality (or "national
character") and its distinctive impact, he does not attend to
differences within national cultures. 48 His work, growing out of
extensive surveys of employees of IBM in 72 countries, seeks to
identify and quantify the dimensions along which national cultures
49
persistently differ from each other.
Binder and his colleagues are to be commended for pursuing an
interdisciplinary approach to cross-cultural interaction. Given its
empirical roots in the study of IBM employees, Hofstede's work has
not surprisingly been quite influential in the literature aimed at
preparing international business people for cross-cultural
communication. 50 For clinical students, who tend to work primarily
with low-income and working-class clients, the literature on crosscultural business interaction may, however, be less helpful than the
large body of works aimed at preparing psychologists and
45. See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL DIFFERENCES
IN WORK-RELATED VALUES (1980); GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURES AND ORGANIZATIONS:

SOFTWARE OF THE MIND (1991) (less scholarly, more reader-friendly popularization);
GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, BEHAVIORS,
INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter
HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II].
46. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 34-37.
47. See HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II, supra note 45, at 25.

48. For a sharp critique of Hofstede's work, see Brendan McSweeney, Hofstede's
Model of National Cultural Differences and Their Consequences: A Triumph of Faith - A Failure
of Analysis, 55 HUM. REL'NS 89 (2002). For a forceful argument that culture is not - as
Hofstede, among many others, implicitly casts it - a static, unchanging set of beliefs and
practices uniformly re-inculcated from generation to generation, but rather is a
dynamically contested realm in which elites and internal challengers struggle to define
what it means to be a member of their culture, see Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54
STAN. L. REV. 495 (2001).

49. Those surveys were conducted twice, in 1967-69 and in 1971-73, generating
116,000 responses. See HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II, supra note 45, at xix, 34.

Hofstede contends that a multiplicity of studies in the intervening years confirm his
generalizations of his findings. Id. at 36. Moreover, he predicts that countries' relative
position on his indices of cultural difference are unlikely to change significantly over the
next hundred years. Id. I have not found his response to the criticism that his sample is
skewed to reflect primarily professional-middle-class beliefs, attitudes, and patterns.
50. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, Legal Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and
Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 195, 217-18 (2004)(citing RICHARD
MEAD, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT: CROSS-CULTURAL DIMENSIONS (2nd ed. 1998);

STEPHEN P. ROBBINS & MARY COULTER, MANAGEMENT 125-29 (6th ed. 1999); Graeme L.
Harrison & Jill L. McKinnon, Cross-Cultural Research in Management Control System
Design:A Review of the CurrentState, 24 ACCT. ORG. & SOC. 483 (1999); Peter B. Smith, The
End of the Beginning?, 1 INT'L J. CROSS-CULTURAL MGMT. 21 (2001)).
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therapists for cross-cultural counseling. 51 In addition to stemming
from a possibly less-on-point genre, another weakness of Hofstede's
approach (of articulating timeless, universal truths about how
national cultures differ) is its tendency to overstate the stability and
homogeneity of cultures - exacerbating the danger of facilely
typecasting members of other cultures and relying on a few rules of
52
thumb to manage them.
The first dimension of cultural difference that Binder and his
colleagues discuss in their latest edition is "uncertainty avoidance,"
or tolerance of unpredictability - with high-avoiders preferring
formal rules and structured situations, while low-avoiders are
,more flexible and comfortable" in the absence of bright-line rules. 53
A second dimension is "power distance," the willingness to accept
an
unequal
distribution
of
power. 54
A
third
is
55
"individualism/ collectivism." A fourth dimension of inter-cultural
difference is "Masculinity/Femininity" - with masculine cultures,
according to Lawyers as Counselors, preferring defined gender roles,
valuing work outside of the home, and being task-oriented,
competitive, and aggressive, while feminine cultures prefer
interchangeable gender roles, resolve conflicts through compromise,
and value teamwork and relationships. 56 A fifth dimension is "Long
Term/Short Term Orientation," which refers to preferred time
51. See, e.g., PAUL B. PEDERSEN, CULTURE-CENTERED COUNSELING INTERVENIONS:
STRIVING FOR ACCURACY (1997); PAUL B. PEDERSEN & ALLEN IVEY, CULTURE-CENTERED
COUNSELING AND INTERVIEWING SKILLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1993); DERALD W. SUE &
DAVID SUE, COUNSELING THE CULTURALLY DIFFERENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed.

1999).
52. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
53. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 34-35. Hofstede
summarizes the issue as "the extent to which a culture programs its members to feel
either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations." HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S
CONSEQUENCES II, supra note 45, at xix.
54. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 35. Hofstede
makes plain that he is discussing "the extent to which the less powerful members of
organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally."
HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II, supra note 45, at xix.
55. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 35. Hofstede
summarizes the issue as "the degree to which individuals are supposed to look after
themselves or remain integrated into groups." HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II,
supra note 45, at xix.
56. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 35. Hofstede's

distinction focuses primarily on the relative valuing of "masculine" assertiveness,
toughness, and focus on ego enhancement and material success versus "feminine"

nurturance, tenderness, and focus on relationship enhancement and quality of life. See
HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II, supra note 45, at 279-97. He also explains that

"Masculinity stands for a society in which social gender roles are clearly distinct" and
"Femininity stands for a society in which gender roles overlap: both men and women
are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life." Id. at 297.

HASTINGS RACE AND POVERTY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4

horizons.5 7 The final cultural distinction Lawyers as Counselors
highlights is "High Context/High Content Communication" - with
high-content cultures attending primarily to the precise words
actually spoken or written and high-context cultures drawing
meaning from the larger context, indirect allusion, and unspoken
cues. 58
Although the text refers to these as "dimensions" of
intercultural difference, it actually treats these distinctions more like
dichotomies. It portrays cultures as belonging on one side or the
other of each of these divides.5 9 Thus, after describing each of these
ways in which cultures differ, it presents a table listing the national
60
cultures that manifest one side or the other of each dimension.
(The U.S., for example, is categorized as an individualistic,
masculine, small-power-distance, short-term oriented society that
relies on high-content communication. 61 ) This assignment of
cultures to sides of these divides is jarring - as both a matter of
63
principle 62 and application.
57. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 35. Short-termoriented cultures strive toward punctuality, seek "to make every moment productive,"
and tend to look for immediate consequences and returns; a long-term orientation, by
contrast, emphasizes tradition, minimizes the significance of strict chronographic time,
and focuses on long-term goals and consequences. Id. at 35. (Hofstede summarizes this
dimension as "the extent to which a culture programs its members to accept delayed
gratification of their material, social, and emotional needs." HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S
CONSEQUENCES II, supranote 45, at xx.)
58. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 35-36. Although
the text makes no mention of it, this dimension of cultural difference is not from
Hofstede, but from cultural anthropologist Edward Twitchell Hall, who identified a
continuum between high-context and low-context cultures. See EDWARD T. HALL,
BEYOND CULTURE 74-101 (1976).
59. Lawyers as Counselors lists the last four of these dimensions as opposed pairs
separated by slashes. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 3536. Hofstede, however, created indices scoring cultures along a continuum on each of
the first five of these dimensions. See HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II, supra note
45, at 28-29.
60. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 37.
61. See id. The only dimension along which the U.S. is not identified is uncertainty
avoidance. Japan is identified at the opposite pole as the U.S. on all five of the
dimensions along which the U.S. is identified. See id. See also infra note 63 (identifying
mistaken attribution of Japanese masculinity/femininity).
62. It took me several readings to understand how such an assignment was
consistent with the statement, immediately preceding the exposition of these dimensions
of intercultural difference, that "Hofstede's dimensions provide you with a heuristic for
thinking about culture differences without requiring that you attribute cultural attitudes
or practices to people from specific ethnic, religious, or national origins." BINDER ET AL.,
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 34. Apparently, assigning traits to national
cultures is not such an attribution, because it is understood that not all individuals will
share the attitudes and practices of their national culture. See supra note 42. (In
Tremblay's article, which the text does not reference, he explicitly defines a heuristic as a
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Placing cultures in a matrix seems likely to make it more
difficult for readers to heed the text's earlier call to take broad
statements about cultures as tentative. 64 It seems, as well, to neglect
the dynamism of people and cultures - the continuous evolution in
which we (individually and collectively) are always engaged, the
ways in which what it means to be a member of a particular group
is often contested by rival forces within the group. 65 While the
desire to guide student-lawyers and to provide answers is
understandable, this approach seems likely to sate, rather than spur,
the curious inquiry and mutual engagement essential for crosscultural and interpersonal success. Identifying six dimensions of
cultural difference and then placing them in a table seems, at least
implicitly, to suggest that these are the important dimensions of
cultural difference that lawyers need to worry about; it certainly
does not explicitly encourage lawyers to explore for additional
differences in the ways they and their clients interpret or act in the
world.
Moreover, in describing dimensions of cultural difference, the
authors occasionally betray more respect for some cultural
approaches than for others. For example, high uncertainty avoiders
are described as sometimes appearing anxious or compulsive, while
low-avoiders are depicted as "flexible and comfortable" in situations
without bright lines. 66 The phrasing betrays a normative preference
tentative generalization subject to modification or abandonment upon the discovery of
more specific information. See Tremblay, supra note 3, at 386-88.) To be fair, on the page
immediately preceding the table assigning national cultures along these dimensions, the
text does reiterate its "earlier proviso about the difficulty inherent in identifying broad
cultural characteristics and ... the dangers of stereotyping." BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS
COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 36. Seeing cultures categorized in chart form makes it
difficult, however, to recall such provisos.
63. In terms of application, Lawyers as Counselors surprisingly labels Japan, Spain,
Ireland, Mexico, Chile, and Austria, as "feminine societies," see id. at 37, which connotes
a preference for interchangeable gender roles. It turns out that Hofstede actually placed
Japan as the most "masculine" culture, Austria the second, Mexico the sixth, and Ireland
tied for seventh most masculine out of 53 countries or regions. See HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S
CONSEQUENCES II, supra note 45, at 285-86. (Similarly, Lawyers as Counselors labels the
U.S., Australia, France, and the Scandinavian countries as masculine societies, see
BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 37, but Hofstede actually
labels all but the first two "feminine," ranking France tied for 35th, Finland 47th,
Norway 52nd, and Sweden 53rd of 53 on his masculinity scale. See HOFSTEDE,
CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES II, supra note 45, at 285-86.)
64. See supra note 42.
65. See, e.g., Sunder, supra note 48, at 516-23 (discussing efforts of gay Boy Scouts,
gay Irish-Americans, pro-choice and pro-contraception Catholics, Muslim women
seeking gender equality, and LGBT Indians to assert their membership in, and thus to
redefine what it means to be a member of, their social groups and cultures). See also
MICHAEL PARENTI, CULTURE STRUGGLE 15-20, 47-87 (2005).

66. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 34-35.
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for low-avoiders over high-avoiders. Similarly, rather than focusing
on high-context communicators' ability to recognize nuances and
implications from unspoken cues, the text highlights instead the
danger that members of such cultures will not understand the terms
terms
of written agreements - or may be unfamiliar with "common
67
such as 'corporation,' 'internet,' 'web page,' or 'SEC."'
4.

Suggested Strategies

Lawyers as Counselors suggests six principles that may aid in
"overcoming inhibitions that may be due to" inter-cultural
differences. 68 The first four of these suggestions are relatively
unproblematic. The text advises that "not all differences are
appropriate for you to overcome... [for] at the end of the day the
client's values trump yours." 69 It encourages lawyers to take
concerted steps to become familiar with different cultures with
which they interact, both by studying their history and by attending
events and meeting people from those cultures. 70 The text urges
lawyers to "conduct counseling sessions in a way that anticipates
the preferences of clients from other cultures" - for example, by
acceding to client preferences for greater formality or by having a
male attorney ask a female client if she would prefer another
woman to sit in on a discussion of uncomfortable topics. 71 It also
suggests it may be important for attorneys to explain the reasons
behind aspects of the U.S. legal system and U.S. lawyers' behavior
72
that might otherwise puzzle clients.
Problematically, however, the text warns lawyers not to be too
"afraid of trampling on a client's cultural preferences" and urges
lawyers to "[g]ive clients credit - if they have strong cultural
preferences, they are likely to inform you about them." 73 Such an
assertion ignores the likelihood that clients accustomed to large
"power distance" will consider it inappropriate to challenge or
67. Id. at 36.
68. Id. at 38.
69. Id. While I share the text's call for lawyers to respect client's values and wishes, I
do not agree that a client's values or wishes necessarily always trump his lawyer's
values. There are some lawyer values - particularly those surrounding the sorts of
conduct the lawyer is or is not willing to engage in or the sorts of consequences she is or
is not willing to bring about - that should not necessarily always be trumped.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 38-39
73. Id. at 39. The example given is that if a female client is "strongly disinclined to
discuss case-related sexual matters" with a male lawyer, the lawyer can "reasonably
expect" the client to ask for another woman to be present for such a conversation.
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confront an attorney's default approach to practice. It seems too to
assume that clients must (and will) engage in "high-content"
communication - explicitly informing their attorney of their
discomfort and preferences - rather than expressing reservations
and
preferences
more
subtly,
through
"high-context"
communication. Such advice puts an untoward burden on clients to
verbalize cultural preferences and to take initiative and
responsibility for identifying and bridging cultural gaps.
The final principle the text offers lawyers also seems to
undermine much of the earlier material in the subchapter. In urging
lawyers not to "abandon... [the] need for pertinent information in
an effort to avoid encroaching on a client's cultural preferences," the
text asserts that in the end, a lawyer's ability to help clients "will
generally entail their understanding what you have to say about
American laws and processes rather than your understanding their
cultures' alternatives." 74 Such advice seems to abandon the
emphasis on contextualized problem-solving - based on thoroughly
understanding clients' values, preferences, expectations, and
reactions to options - that I understand to be at the heart of clientcentered lawyering. 75 For only by pushing ourselves, with clients'
help, to understand how they look at things can we try to fully
understand the context within which they frame their problem and
react to possible solutions.
Taken together, these final suggestions seem likely to imply - at
least to those most attracted to such a suggestion - that, when all is
said and done, it is clients who must adjust themselves to lawyers'
cultural preferences and to dominant U.S. cultural norms. 76 At the
very least, these passages send a markedly mixed message about
how hard lawyers should work to understand and adjust to clients'
cultural preferences and patterns. But exactly because it is so
difficult to adapt one's ways of thinking and acting to fit the
patterns, views, and preferences of another, it is imperative that we
not encourage ourselves (or our students) to give up when the going
74. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
75. See Piomelli, Appreciating CollaborativeLawyering, supra note 11, at 488-90.
76. Following these suggestions, the text states: "Another strategy you can pursue is
to look upon your clients as resources rather than guessing at the reasons for their
seeming reluctance to participate actively or to seek outcomes that strike you as strange
or perhaps even improper." BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at
39. Treating clients (and their communities) as resourceful partners with whom a lawyer
collaborates to solve problems is at the heart of the vision of law practice that I have
discussed at length. See works cited supra note 11. Unfortunately, Lawyers as Counselors'
suggestion in this regard does not receive the saliency it deserves, because it is
immediately preceded by the mixed messages just described, see supra notes 73-74 and
accompanying text, and is phrased as optional: "[alnother strategy" that a lawyer "can"
pursue. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at 39.
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gets tough, to just wait for clients to traverse the cultural distance
that separates them from us (and us from them). We owe ourselves
and our clients more - especially those of us who aspire to making
progressive social change through our lawyering.
B.

A More Consistent Approach: Krieger and Neumann's
EssentialLawyering Skills

The latest edition of Stefan Krieger and Richard Neumann's
Essential Lawyering Skills, 77 published in 2003, addresses crosscultural lawyering skills in a nine-page chapter entitled
"Multicultural Lawyering." 78 While not nearly as dominant in the
market as Lawyers as Counselors,79 in several respects Krieger and
Neumann's text does a significantly better job of preparing students
for cross-cultural lawyering - at least in terms of how lawyers
should consider and respond to other cultures.
1.

Unambivalent Insistence on Importance of Lawyers' Recognizing and
Adjusting to Clients' Cultures

Essential Lawyering Skills opens its chapter by insisting: "A
lawyer can be effective only if the lawyer understands cultural differences
and knows how to recognize and deal with them." 80 It consistently
reinforces the point that cross-cultural competency is a fundamental
skill at the heart of client-centered representation, not just
something a lawyer only uses occasionally - to deal with atypical,
difficult clients. 81 Krieger and Neumann's text emphasizes that
to respect the cultural, racial, ethnic, and gender differences that
exist between us and our clients ... means that we recognize the
differences and adapt to them rather than assume that the client
will adapt to us .... And we adapt.., sincerely because
insincerity is condescension. 82

77. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5.

78. See id. at 49-57. The first edition of their text, published in 1999, did not contain a
similar chapter. See STEFAN H. KRIEGER, RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., KATHLEEN H.
MCMANUS & STEVEN D. JAMAR, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING,
COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND PERSUASIVE FACr ANALYSIS (1999).

79. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5.
80. See KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5, at 49.
81. See id. at 52. Jacobs argued that the first edition of Lawyers as Counselors, BINDER
ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS I, supra note 1, was likely to deem clients of color and
low-income clients as atypical and difficult. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 353-61.

82. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5, at 52.
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It also reinforces that ignoring difference is not a viable option,
for it "alienate[s] clients, witnesses, other lawyers, and judges" and
it "cuts... [one] off from a great deal of information."83
In all of these regards, the text forcefully presents a consistent
message that cultural differences between a lawyer and client must
be recognized, appreciated, respected, and traversed - and that a
lawyer must learn to leave his cultural comfort zone to meet a client
in hers.
2.

Broad Definition of Culture

Krieger and Neumann define culture broadly as "a body of
values, customs, and ways of looking at the world shared by a
group of people."8 4 They explicitly note that cultures are not just
based on ethnicity, race, locality, or geography, but also upon
gender, age, religion, immigration status, disability, sexual
orientation, socioeconomic status (i.e., "income, education, or
both"), occupation, and even "the organization in which one
works." 85 Their text also repeatedly discusses the existence of
multiple cultures within the U.S., a "majority culture" and
numerous "minority cultures." 86 Excerpts from linguist Deborah
Tannen's works describing how women and men practice law,
converse, and interact differently comprise the final four pages of
their chapter. 87
A broad definition of culture (and its multiplicity of potential
sources) is important for a several reasons. It alerts students and
lawyers to a fuller range of background influences that can shape
people and interactions. It thus encourages us to broaden our
88
horizons and to attend to multiple layers of potential meaning. It
also highlights that a lawyer cannot become complacent simply
because she shares one or more cultural identities with her client.

83. Id. at 49-50.
84. Id.
at 49.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 50-52. This terminology is potentially misleading in its emphasis on
population size, rather than social dominance, as the relevant distinguishing feature of
cultures within the U.S. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
87. See id. at 54-57. The excerpts are from DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 TO 5:
WOMEN AND MEN AT WORK 124-25 (1994); DEBORAH TANNEN, YOU JUST DON'T

14-17, 49-50, 297-98 (1990).
88. As Sue Bryant notes, a broad definition of culture "teach[es] students that no
single characteristic will completely define the lawyer's or client's culture." Bryant, supra
note 3, at 41.
UNDERSTAND: WOMEN AND MEN IN CONVERSATION
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Although the text does not articulate the point, others have
addressed the risks that such complacency can lead lawyers to
presume, rather than to explore, clients' values and preferences, and
to ignore dynamics - such as other dimensions of cultural difference
- that lead clients to still perceive the lawyer as an outsider. 89 A
broad definition of culture, in short, makes cross-cultural
competency relevant for all lawyers.
3.

Non-Judgmental, Nuanced Presentationof Dimensions of Cultural
Difference

Kreiger and Neumann non-judgmentally portray the many
dimensions along which cultures can differ and explain how those
differences can affect one's lawyering. 90 Their text explicitly
discusses cultural differences as a matter of placement along a
spectrum, rather than simply assigning cultures to one side or
another of a dichotomy. For example, it notes:
The world is not divided into conflict-tolerant cultures and
conflict-intolerant cultures. Instead cultures have a broad range of
attitudes toward conflict, from those that honor conflict (such as
the majority U.S. culture) to those that dishonor it, with many
cultures somewhere in between. And in some cultures some kinds
of conflict are acceptable but others are not. 91
Kreiger and Neumann cover many of the same dimensions of
cultural difference as Lawyers as Counselors92 - which came out a
year later - but they do so more artfully and non-judgmentally.
Their text routinely brings the issue back to the possible
89. Jerry L6pez, for example, has explored both phenomena. He has described
"Teresa," a fictionalized Latina impact litigator who presumes to know what her lowincome Latino clients want and need, and contrasted her with "Amos," an AfricanAmerican attorney who grew up in the community to which he has returned to practice,
but recognizes that his law degree, and the very fact he was able to leave, may lead
many in his community to view him as an outsider. See GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE 13-17, 34-37 (1992).

Christine Zuni Cruz too has described the challenge of successfully navigating the "road
back in" to a community and culture one was born and raised in, but then left to pursue
higher education. See Zuni Cruz, supra note 3.
90. The text notes, for example, that cultural norms and patterns impact not only
what people say and do, but even what they remember about events. See KRIEGER &
NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5, at 50.

91. Id. I thank Patti Chang for pointing out that the dominant U.S. culture does not
always honor conflict, particularly in the areas of politics or religion, which are often
treated as taboo subjects to avoid raising with acquaintances, friends, and even family.
92. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5.
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consequence of each potential cultural difference between lawyer
and client. It poses each dimension of cultural difference as a
question, without betraying a preference for one answer or another.
Instead of framing the issue as "power distance," for example, it
asks: "Is hierarchy valued?" 93 It breaks up "masculinity/femininity"
into two questions: "How is conflict viewed?" 94 and "How
acceptable is it to show emotion or talk about emotion?" 95 Instead of
categorizing levels of "uncertainty avoidance," it asks: "Is formality
valued?" 96 It also asks: "Which is more important, the individual or
98
the group?" 97 and "What does body language communicate?"
With each of these questions, the text discusses the mainstream U.S.
answer and mentions that some other cultures come out differently.
But it does not identify those other cultures - an approach that
leaves more for lawyers to attend to and inquire about, rather than
looking up an expert's categorization of the client's culture.
Refreshingly, the text heeds its own advice that one shows
"respect for a culture by trying to understand it and all its
complexities. Respect includes genuine curiosity and a willingness
to accept the culture on its own terms rather than judging it." 99
Kreiger and Neumann demonstrate this approach best in their
discussion of "How much is typically said in words, and how much
is left to implication or context?" 100 After noting that "majority U.S.
culture" communicates largely expressly by focusing on the precise
words spoken or written, and that many other cultures consider
such communication "unsubtle or rudely blunt," their text notes
that in some other cultures, "words are carefully chosen to imply
messages that are not spoken." 101 It then describes, as a relational
matter, the potential for misunderstanding when someone from
such a culture interacts with someone who communicates as the
mainstream U.S. culture does. Instead of focusing on what the more
subtle (i.e., high-context) communicator will not understand, 102 the
text emphasizes that "the person from the majority U.S. culture
might not hear the other person's implications and might become
impatient, wrongly assuming that the other person is

93. NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5, at 51.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 51.
Id.
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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uncommunicative." 103 And it goes further, noting that in the context
of negotiation, "American lawyers, who otherwise may be among
the wordiest and most blunt people on earth, communicate a great
deal through implication and context" in order to send messages
without having a blunt statement used against them. 104 The text's
method helps students to appreciate the value of the approaches of
other cultures and, by showing that lawyers may sometimes adopt
such approaches, makes those cultures seem less exotically "Other."
4.

Suggested Strategies

Kreiger and Neumann's text offers only a few broad
suggestions. It counsels that rather than striving vainly to try to
memorize the purported traits and customs of a vast array of other
cultures, lawyers should seek to develop an instinctual feel for
situations where another's cultural assumptions differ from one's
own. 105 The text encourages the lawyer: (1) to learn not only the
customs and values of her clients' cultures, but also the way those
cultures view the world in general and the lawyer's culture
specifically; (2) to attempt to foresee potential trouble spots and plan
adaptations to the client's culture that will neither stereotype nor
offend her client; and (3) to apologize promptly and succinctly for
any cross-cultural mistakes she makes. 10 6 Finally, and most
importantly, it implores lawyers "to be open-minded and curious
about how other people think and act and why they think and act
that way. A generous frame of mind on your part and a genuine
liking for other people - and their differences - go a long way in this
respect." 107
108
In emphasizing the lawyer's need to adapt to other cultures,
109
and to remain open-minded, curious, and generous,
the text
begins to direct at least some attention to the lawyer side of the
attorney-client relationship. 110 Although largely focused on what
103. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5, at 51.
104. Id.

105. Id. at 53.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 82.
109. See supra note 107.
110. I share Carwina Weng's conviction that it is essential to encourage lawyers to
develop cultural self-awareness and her dismay that in Kreiger and Neumann's text
"awareness of the other, rather than of the self, takes precedence." See Weng supra note
3, at 383-84. Weng overstates the critique, however, in asserting that Kreiger and
Neumann fail completely to "delv[e] into developing cultural self-awareness" and to
"detail cultural differences." Id. Their text certainly does detail the dimensions along
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lawyers should know about diverse others, it takes this small, but
important, step toward attending to the lawyer's frame of mind and
attitudinal stance toward her clients. Ultimately, however, larger
strides are required in this direction of lawyer introspection.
C. The Attention to Clients and Lawyers of Cochran, DiPippa,
and Peters' The Counselor-at-Law
The clinical text on interviewing and counseling that first
placed significant emphasis on the lawyer's side of the cross-cultural
relationship is Robert Cochran, John DiPippa, and Martha Peters'
The Counselor-at-Law.111 The text, initially published in 1999, frames
the issue as "Dealing with Client-Lawyer Difference" and devotes a
nineteen-page chapter to it.112 Instead of focusing on the culturally
different client's motivation to participate, 1 3 or concentrating on
understanding and adapting to the client's culture, 114 Cochran,
DiPippa, and Peters emphasize that lawyers must develop both an
understanding of clients' cultures and a self-awareness of their own
culture - and its impact on themselves and on their clients from
different cultures. Their text argues that bridging difference requires
both a commitment to familiarize oneself with "cultural patterns,
world views, and life experiences of diverse populations" and "a
personal commitment to increase self-awareness." 115
1. A Broad Understandingof Relevant Difference
Sometimes the text frames the issue as achieving "cross-cultural
which cultures can differ, see supra notes 90-104, and in doing so it always identifies how
mainstream U.S. culture values or handles various issues. What their text fails explicitly
to highlight, however, is the importance of knowing oneself and monitoring one's
reactions to and interactions with others.
111. COCHRAN Er AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW I, supra note 5.

112. Id. at 203-21. A second edition of the text was published in 2006. See COCHRAN ET
AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW I, supra note 5. The new edition's chapter on "Dealing
with Client-Lawyer Difference" is almost identical to that of the 1999 version, containing
one additional footnote and a few word changes. See id. at 205-23. Citations will
hereafter be to the 2006 edition. The page and font size of the two editions are slightly
different, so page cites to the new edition are often, but not always, two pages higher
than in the first edition.
113. As discussed above, see supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text, this is the
central concern of BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5.
114. As discussed above, see supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text, this is the focus
of KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS

II, supra note 5.

115. COCHRAN Er AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 206.
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understanding" and other times it discusses it in terms of dealing
with, or bridging, difference.1 6 Regardless of the terminology
employed, it makes plain that the issues are "not merely a matter of
race and ethnicity," but also involve the broad range of differences
in "gender, sexual orientation, disability, religio[n], socioeconomic
status, [and] age," as well as "micro-cultural differences" (such as
differentiations among "Hispanics" within the U.S. or between
117
different socio-economic classes within a racial or ethnic group).
The text underscores the importance of a broad understanding of
the dimensions of difference, noting that "[p]articularly when client
and lawyer are both from the United States, but from different
regions, social classes, or cultural heritages, there may be false
assumptions of similar perception."" 8 The text casts these
differences as "compos[ing] and focus[ing] the lenses through which
clients and lawyers experience the world"; these lenses, "embedded
in the identity of people," constitute potential barriers to trust - both
the client's trust of the lawyer and the lawyer's of the client - and to
"congruent perceptions and interpretations." 119
The text makes explicit that the differences it discusses are
linked to, and relevant in large part because of, disparities in power.
It often speaks, for example, of "dominant" cultures and groups,
rather than simply "majority" and "minority" ones. 120 Such a
framing highlights the importance of the unequal power of social
groups - many of whom are numerical minorities - to set the
cultural norms and standards to which others must adapt. Examples
of such norm-setting numerical minorities include men, Whites in
many cities and some metropolitan areas of the U.S., as well as the
121
professional middle class.
116. See, e.g., id. at 205-06.
117. Id. at 206, 210.
118. Id. at 213.
119. Id. at 206.
120. See, e.g., id. at 208, 216.
121. See, e.g., D'Vera Cohn, Area Soon to be Mostly Minority: Shift in 4-8 Years Will
Reshape Politics, Priorities,Experts Say, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 25, 2006, at Al (Whites
already minority in greater metropolitan areas of Miami, Houston, Los Angeles, and San
Francisco, soon to be joined by New York and Washington, D.C. areas); Silver, supra
note 3, at 229 ("Nearly half of the nation's 100 largest cities are home to more minorities
than Whites.") (citing Eric Schmitt, Whites in Minority in Largest Cities, the Census Shows,
N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001, at Al); Jack Metzgar, Politics and the American Class Vernacular,
in NEW WORKING-CLASS STUDIES 189, 201 (John Russo & Sherry Lee Linkon, eds. 2005)
(professional/managerial occupations comprise 30 percent of workforce in U.S. and
people with bachelor's or higher degrees constitute 25 percent of population 25 years old
or older); Michael Zweig, Introduction - The Challenge of Working Class Studies, in WHAT'S
CLASS GOT TO Do WITH IT?: AMERICAN SOCIETY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 7

(Michael Zweig ed. 2004) (middle class - of professionals, supervisors, and small
business owners - comprises 36 percent of U.S. population).
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The Importance of Self-Awareness and Escaping Cultural
Encapsulation

In addition to fostering client participation, Cochran and his
colleagues emphasize that a lawyer must develop sufficient crosscultural skill to avoid misinterpreting her client's information by
failing to appreciate his cultural concerns and convictions. 122 They
note that a lawyer must monitor not only what her client says, but
also how she feels about him and his culture. 123 Their text urges the
lawyer to develop a contextualized understanding not only of her
client and his problem, but also of herself. This requires vigilant
attention to "one's own cultural perspectives and their impact on
attitudes, communication patterns, interactional habits, and cultural
24
assumptions."1
The text states that the "first and perhaps greatest challenge in
legal interviewing and counseling is to become aware of and sensitive
to personal biases and subjective attitudes that unknowingly affect
one's relationships with clients." 125 It urges lawyers to develop selfawareness of themselves and their culture so that they can break out
of "cultural encapsulation." 1 26 By this Cochran and his colleagues
mean lawyers must learn not to "unconsciously apply[] their own
cultural methods and strategies as if they were universal," but
rather must "adapt their habits, patterns, behaviors, and attitudes
when working with diverse clients. 127 To transcend cultural
encapsulation, their text insists a lawyer must become aware "of the
ways one's own culture influences beliefs, values, experiences of the
world, and interactions with others." 128 Once identified, the
objective is then to be able "to step outside of our strong perceptual
129
fields" to meaningfully engage with others.
This emphasis on truly understanding ourselves, and how our
cultures help shape us, is a basic tenet of the literature on cross-

122. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 205.
123. Id. at 213-14.

124. Id at 213.
125. Id. at 207.
126. Id. The text credits the concept of cultural encapsulation to C.G Wrenn. See C.G.
Wrenn, The Culturally EncapsulatedCounselor,32 HARV. EDUC. REV. 444-49 (1962).
127. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 207.
128. Id. at 222.
129. Id. at 207.
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cultural lawyering 130 and psychological counseling.131 It is therefore
surprising that among the latest clinical textbooks, only Cochran,
DiPippa, and Peters' book focuses explicitly and extensively on
lawyer self-knowledge and cultural introspection as a necessary
cross-cultural skill.
The text also emphasizes that a lawyer must pay attention to
how his culturally conditioned perceptions of his clients can impact
his expectations about their cases - as well as his own and his
clients' behavior and performance. 132 Noting that "[e]xpectations of
success affect actual outcomes," it explains that penetrating
introspection is essential because "[wie can [only] modify our
reactions once we are aware of our less conscious, culturally learned
reactions." 133 Again, the text is unique among its competitors in
stressing (at least in the discussion of cross-cultural issues) the
interactive nature of the attorney-client relationship, the ways in
which the attitudes, expectations, and conduct of each actor shape
the other - indeed the ways in which one's attitudes, expectations,
and conduct reverberate (whether one recognizes them or not)
through the relationship.134
The text also notes that power impacts the ease with which
people can recognize their cultural assumptions (and the frequency
with which they must). It declares:
Generally, the more characteristics a person has that are dominant
within a society, the harder the person has to work to challenge
his own assumptions. On the other hand, minority and
subordinate groups must frequently confront the differences
between their own cultural
learning and the standards of majority
135
and dominant cultures.
130. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 3, at 49 ("knowing yourself as a cultural being is an
on-going and necessary process for cross-cultural competence"); Jacobs, supra note 1, at
395 ("if we can help a student become self-aware, it may lead the student to reduce the
level of cultural insensitivity displayed toward the client. Becoming self-aware may
enable the student to display a heightened awareness of possible negative nonverbal
cuing she may be transmitting to the client."); Silver, supra note 3, at 230 ("Learning
about another culture's customs is only one component of multicultural competence.
Acquiring such competence also requires a deliberate exploration of the deeply rooted
cultural assumptions that claim us. This, in turn, requires an exploration of our own
biases and stereotypes about individuals and groups different from ourselves."); Weng,
supra note 3, at 389 ("key to developing multicultural competence is cultural selfawareness").
131. See, e.g., Weng, supra note 3, at 372 n.16, citing PEDERSEN, supra note 51, at 203;
SUE & SUE, supra note 51, at 17.
132. See COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 213.
133. Id. at 213-14.
134. See id. at 213-17. Jacobs identified and discussed the importance of "expectancies"
and self-fulfilling prophecies. See Jacobs, supra note 1, at 377-84.
135. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 208. Cf.supra note
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This notion of the dual consciousness of people from
subordinated groups was, of course, explored over a century ago by
1
W.E.B. Dubois. 36
3.

Additional Dimensions of Difference, Including Some From Lawyer's
ProfessionalSocialization

Cochran, DiPippa, and Peters' text also attends to aspects of
non-U.S. and non-White cultures. It suggests lawyers should "take
the time to learn about different cultural patterns and expectations,
because a lawyer's knowledge indicates to clients respect for their
diversity, interest and concern for them and their identified group,
and a commitment to learning about their culture." 137 The text
describes, for example, diversity in "cultural rapport-building
rituals and patterns," such as different reactions to the use of first
names, shaking hands, physical distance between lawyers and
clients, and eye contact or aversion. 138 In doing so, it ascribes
patterns and positions to particular groups, such as Muslims,
African Americans, and White Americans - sometimes clearly
139
couching the ascriptions as tentative, other times not.
The text discusses ways in which some common assumptions of
mainstream U.S. professionals may be out of step with other
cultures. Like its competitors, The Counselor-at-Law notes that
commitments to the individual as the basic unit of society and to
independence over interdependence are not universal. 140 But it also
raises other important differences. It points out, for example, that
mainstream U.S. lawyers may assume problems are effectively
categorized (and resolved) by academic or professional discipline
(i.e., that an issue is a legal problem, or a psychological one, or a
social work one), an assumption that may prove problematic for
clients who "operate from more holistic frameworks and
39 and accompanying text.
136. See W.E.B. DuBoIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS (1903). See also THIS BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria
Anzalddia eds., 1981).
137. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 210.

138. Id. at 209-10.
139. See id. The text, for example, states as a matter of "fact" that "it is a huge affront
to offer the left hand or to give something with the left hand to a Moslem." Id. at 209. It
uses adverbs such as "generally" and "likely" and verbs such as "tends" to discuss
White American and African American preferences with regard to physical distance and
eye contact. Id.
140. See id. at 211-12. See also supra notes 55, 97 and accompanying text (similar
discussion in other texts).
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traditions." 1 41 The text also warns that a tendency to "value linear
thinking over nonlinear thinking" can cause lawyers to tune out and
1 42
write off some clients, destroying prospects for communication.
Additionally, it suggests that a "critical assumption" of many
mainstream U.S. lawyers that warrants questioning is the notion
that "the 'problem' is with the individual and not with the system,"
for "[t]he system is part of the cultural encapsulation of those who
benefit from it." 143
Each of the last three potential differences flows at least in part
from, or is amplified by, U.S. lawyers' professional socialization. As
a vast literature explores in great detail, and as Part II.C of this essay
discusses, lawyers interested in working to effect social change are
well advised to pay close attention to our professional culture and
the impact it can have on our relationships with low-income and
working-class clients and communities.'"
141. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 212.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Jerry L6pez, Lucie White, Luke Cole, Jennifer Gordon, Louise Trubek, I, and
many others, advocate transforming the lawyer-client relationship and scope of
lawyering activity to encourage joint, collaborative efforts between lawyers, clients,
communities, and other allies to push collectively for social change. See, e.g., LUKE COLE
& SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP-ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN
SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005); LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING,
supra note 89; Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection:The Need
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992); Luke W. Cole, Macho Law
Brains, Public Citizens, and GrassrootsActivists: Three Models of Environmental Advocacy, 14
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 687 (1995); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road By Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV
407 (1995); Gerald P. L6pez, Living and Lawyering Rebelliously, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2041
(2005); Gerald P. L6pez, Shaping Community Problem Solving Around Community
Knowledge, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 59 (2004); Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible? Ethical
Community Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147 (2000); Piomelli, Appreciating Collaborative
Lawyering, supra note 11; Piomelli, Democratic Roots of CollaborativeLawyering, supra note
11; Piomelli, Foucault'sApproach to Power, supra note 11; Dean Hill Rivkin, Lawyering,
Power, and Reform: The Legal Campaign to Abolish the Broad Form Mineral Deed, 66 TENN. L.
REV. 467 (1999); Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lawyering: Toward a New Public Interest
Practice, 1 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991); Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers,
Clients, and Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1996); Lucie E. White,
"Democracy" in Development Practice:Essays on a Fugitive Theme, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1073
(1997); Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyering for Poor Communities in the Twenty-First
Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813 (1998); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of
the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 535
(1987-88); Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699. Anthony Alfieri has also associated his work with this
approach to lawyering. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of Poverty Law and a
Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 659 (1987-88);
Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
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Suggested Strategies

Cochran and his colleagues offer a long list of "Do's and
Don'ts" for interacting across difference. 145 Some of these
suggestions for lawyer behavior reflect their text's emphasis on the
centrality of developing self-awareness and guarding against
cultural encapsulation. For example, they urge the lawyer to
"monitor yourself so that you do not fall into stereotyping clients"
and to "be genuine." 146 Their text also emphasizes the importance of
attorney-client dialogue, urging lawyers "not [to] be afraid to
[respectfully] ask" clients when something about their story,
conduct, preferences, or beliefs is puzzling or unclear. Unlike its
competitors, it also explicitly notes that "cultural diversity not only
poses a challenge for building lawyer-client rapport, but also
damages clients when differences are not understood and valued by
147
legal decision makers."
D. Assessing the Textbooks in the Context of the Broader
Clinical Literature on Cross-Cultural Lawyering
As a group, the texts reviewed are a significant advance over
their predecessors. The only one whose section on cross-cultural
lawyering I would not recommend is Binder, Bergman, Price, and
Tremblay's Lawyers as Counselors.148 Krieger and Neumann's
Essential Lawyering Skills shares a problematically lopsided focus on
the client's side of the attorney-client cross-cultural relationship, but
its presentation of that aspect is so strong, I would still assign it to
students - with supplementing materials that pay greater attention
to the attorney's side. 149 I would also endorse Cochran, DiPippa,
and Peters' The Counselor-at-Law,for its emphasis on the importance
of lawyer self-awareness and of recognizing and escaping cultural
encapsulation. 150 Indeed a combination of the relevant chapters of
Narrative,100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).
145. See COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 220-22.
146. Id. at 220.
147. Id. at 221.
148. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5.See supra notes 14-76 and
accompanying text.
149. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5. See supra
notes 77-110 and accompanying text.
150. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5. See supra notes 111-47
and accompanying text.
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the latter two texts might be particularly effective.
Of course, a textbook is unlikely, on its own, to prepare
students to lawyer effectively across cultural difference. Such
preparation must occur on cognitive, affective, and behavioral levels
- directing attention to what we know about others (and ourselves),
how we feel about them (and ourselves), and how we act on our
knowledge and feelings. 151 Only immersing cultural issues
pervasively throughout a clinical curriculum, with repeated
opportunities to address, practice, and reflect upon them, is likely to
maximize student-lawyers' competence. 152 But clinical texts can
highlight the importance of such competence, provide cognitive
tools for understanding the dynamics at play, and suggest areas for
behavioral change.
Recognizing the space limitations and ensuing difficult choices
of what to include in a textbook, there are several respects in which
these texts could productively expand their horizons by
incorporating insights from the existing clinical literature on crosscultural lawyering. 153 Without extensively lengthening their
chapters, the texts could benefit by reconceptualizing their goal as
imparting habits rather than just information, expanding their
attention from the cognitive and behavioral realms to the affective
domain as well, and also exploring the challenges that may flow
from cultural sameness, not just cultural difference.
Framing the issue, as Sue Bryant and Jean Koh Peters do, 154 as
the acquisition of habits, rather than simply information, reinforces
the insight that cross-cultural competence necessarily entails
cognitive, emotional, and behavioral dimensions, each of which is
most effectively developed and enhanced through repeated practice
and use.15 5 Attention to fostering habits also potentially accentuates
a different understanding of the central goal of cross-cultural
151. See Bryant, supra note 3, at 48.
152. In our core, semester-long offering in the Civil Justice Clinic at U.C. Hastings, my
teaching colleagues (Shauna Marshall, Miye Goishi, Donna Ryu, Eumi Lee, and Gail
Silverstein) and I devote six full class sessions spread across the semester, i.e., thirteen
hours of seminar discussion, as well as three writing assignments, to exploring issues of
cross-cultural difference. Mark Aaronson, who used to teach the course with us, has
previously described some of these sessions. See Mark Neal Aaronson, We Ask You to
Consider: Learning About PracticalJudgment in Lawyering, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 247, 311-18
(1998). See also infra notes 160-67 and accompanying text for additional description of our
approach.
153. See works cited supra at notes 1,3.
154. See Bryant, supra note 3. Bryant recognizes Koh Peters as an author of the "Five
Habits" approach, even though she did not author the work cited. See id. at 33, 35. Koh
Peters includes a chapter on "the Habits" in JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN
IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS (2d ed. 2001).

155. See Bryant, supra note 3, at 48.
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competence: The aim becomes not simply to learn a few techniques
for how to understand or to manage people who differ from us, but
instead to learn how best to change our orientations and ourselves to
maximize our ability to interact with and learn from each other.
Reformulating the goal as developing habits radically shifts the
relevant timeframe: it connotes - more accurately - a concerted,
long-term effort likely to last not just a class session or two, or a
semester, but a lifetime.
As outlined above, the textbooks' consideration of crosscultural lawyering focuses primarily on what student-lawyers
should know, with some suggestions on how they might act. But
cross-cultural lawyering theorists, again led by Bryant and Koh
Peters, direct important attention to the affective or emotional level
too. They note, as the textbooks do not, that cross-cultural
interactions and self-critical introspection can be stressful and
anxiety-provoking, as can cross-cultural training itself. 156 The stress
stems in part from the change-oriented goal of the training and
inquiry. 57 Thus Bryant and Koh Peters underscore the importance
of providing students the emotional support and motivation to
grow and change. 58 Consequently they emphasize the importance
of remaining non-judgmental, not only of our clients, but also of
ourselves. 159 Indeed they deem non-judgmental thinking "a core
156. Describing those aspects of diversity trainings that they sought to avoid, Bryant
discusses what Koh Peters labels the three "Ghosts of Diversity Past": (1) designing
training exclusively for White students; (2) placing "unfair burdens on students of color
to educate White students;" and (3) "the ghost of judgment that often resulted in naming
and blaming or the fear of such occurrences during a diversity training." Id. at 57.
157. As Bryant explains:
We are training students to be non-judgmental and to develop new levels of
tolerance, new modes of thinking and valuing as well as new behavior.
Students may experience this as a threat to their cultural identity. In addition,
some students may experience stress because classmates articulate world views
that are painful. Other students may experience stress because they have done
something that exposed biases that they are embarrassed to acknowledge.
Id. at 59-60 (footnotes omitted).
158. See id. at 57 ("teachers need to take into account the emotional needs of crosscultural learners").
159. As Bryant writes:
Refraining from judgments and being open to difference is an essential skill for
effective cross-cultural lawyers.... To honestly unearth our own cultural
assumptions, stereotypes and biases and examine them, we need to view them
without shame or judgment or self-condemnation, but with an eye towards
understanding them and, where necessary, rectifying or eradicating them. To
understand our clients, we need to use the same kind of non-judgmental
approach.
Id. at 49 n.54. See also id. at 58 ("We use a teaching approach that asks students to be nonjudgmental towards themselves, as they inevitably will make mistakes, yet at the same
time stresses the importance of lawyering in a way that addresses stereotypes and
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cross-cultural skill," one that is particularly challenging given
160
lawyers' professional socialization.
This attention to creating an emotional atmosphere that fosters
students' willingness and ability to honestly look at and strive to
change themselves is, of course, a central responsibility of the
clinical faculty who teach the courses in which the textbooks are
used. One of the ways my colleagues and I at the Civil Justice Clinic
attempt to reach students on the affective level is by showing an
extraordinary film, The Color of Fear.161 The film explores the impact
of race on the lives of nine men, as revealed through their discussion
at a weekend retreat. 162 We use the film - well into the semester,
once the class has bonded as a community - because it grounds
abstract principles about dealing with difference, 163 triggers and
explores intense emotional reactions, 64 and models genuine
biases.").
160. See id. at 56 n.83. Regarding lawyers and law students, Bryant notes: "Our
training includes being called upon in classroom discussion to judge a case based on
limited, digested casebook facts.... Students are often taught that assessing client
credibility is a critical piece of the lawyers' role that begins in the initial interview." Id.
161. THE
COLOR
OF
FEAR
(Stir-Fry
Productions
1994).
See
also
http://www.stirfryseminars.com/pages/coloroffear.htm (last visited Sep. 16, 2006).
162. The gathering was convened by Lee Mun Wah, a community therapist, who
invited two other men of Asian descent (David Lee and Yutaka Matsumato), two Black
men (Victor Lewis and Loren Moye), two Latino men (Roberto Almanzan and Hugh
Vazquez), and two White men (David Christensen and Gordon Clay). The men, from the
greater San Francisco Bay Area, span a wide range of ages. They combine deeply
insightful intellectual analyses of race and extraordinary abilities to recognize and
discuss their emotions.
163. We use -the film in conjunction with excerpts from Minow, supra note 33; Martha
Minow, Differences Among Difference, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 165 (1991); Stephanie M.
Wildman with Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of Privilege Visible, in PRIVILEGE
REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA (Stephanie M. Wildman

ed. 1996). We also assign a powerful essay by Vietnamese-born anthropologist and law
professor Maivf.n Clech Lam, describing and theorizing four interactions in which a
series of White women presume to know better than, speak for, and instruct her and
other people of color from formerly colonized nations. See Maivin Clech am, Feeling
Foreignin Feminism, 19 SIGNS 865 (1994).
We precede the showing of THE COLOR OF FEAR, supra note 161, with a 20-minute
segment from a television magazine show, Primetime Live: True Colors (ABC television
broadcast Sept. 26, 1991), which uses hidden cameras to capture the experiences of two
discrimination testers - one White, one Black - when they move to St. Louis. The
segment documents blatantly different treatment the testers experience as they apply for
jobs and rental housing, shop for shoes, music, and cars, and hail taxi cabs.
We devote three hours of discussion, over the course of two class sessions, to the
films and readings, and ask students to write a paper as well. We urge students to
consider how issues of race are similar to and different from other cross-cultural
dynamics.
164. Well into the film, for example, Lee Mun Wah, the facilitator and director, reveals
that his mother was murdered by an African-American man and that he is in part driven
to make the film to repudiate his father's conviction that different races cannot live (or

Fall 2006]

CROSS-CULTURAL LAWYERING BY THE BOOK

compassion for and engagement with one's own experience and
with others'.165 A central theme of the film is that to talk honestly
about race in the U.S. we must first explore the fear, pain, and hurt
we each have experienced; only by becoming self-aware of how race
shapes our own existence can we hope to tackle the issue
1 66

constructively.

One of the key moments in the film occurs when a White man
who has steadfastly denied the validity of the attitudes and
experiences recounted by the men of color finally appears to
understand enough about himself and his formative experience (as a
child of an abusive and racist father) to be willing and able to hear
and consider the experiences of the other men. Shortly after that
moment, in a subsequently filmed narration, participant Roberto
Almanzan urges the audience: "Stretch out your arms and take hold
of the cloth that covers you. The cure for the pain is in the pain.
Good and bad are mixed. If you do not have both, you don't belong
with us." 167 His emphasis on searching not for unattainable purity,
but for a commitment to recognize and work to change the utterly
human imperfections in each of us, exemplifies the introspective but
non-judgmental engagement that we, Bryant and Koh Peters, and
other cross-cultural theorists seek to encourage and aspire to model.
A final way in which the textbooks examined could beneficially
incorporate aspects of the cross-cultural lawyering literature would
be to highlight that a lawyer must not only attend to cultural
difference, but also to the dangers of cultural sameness. As Bryant and
Koh Peters note, situations where lawyers perceive shared cultural
backgrounds with their clients pose a risk that lawyers may
"substitut[e] their own judgment for the client's as a result of overeven talk) together in harmony or understanding. See THE COLOR OF FEAR, supra note
161.
165. Cognizant of the emotional power of the film and the topic, we begin discussion
by asking each student to focus on a particular man in the film (whom we assign in
advance) and then to describe him (drawing on both empathy and detachment), to
describe his general worldview and how he approaches issues of difference, and - if the
student feels comfortable - to describe how that character's views compare to the
student's view.
166. The film's closing theme song, written by Peter Barclay in a didactic style
completely different from that of the film itself, begins:
You think someone is going to destroy you,
If you don't have the upper hand.
You are afraid of the differences of people.
You must destroy them.
Can't you see it's fear that's driving you insane,
Eating you alive and causing you much pain?
You've got to walk right through your fear....
THE COLOR OF FEAR, supra note 161.
167. Id.
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identification or transference." 168 Such situations may also lead
lawyers to fail to explore issues in sufficient depth, because they
assume the client's cultural similarity leads him to similar thinking
and motivation. 169 To avoid both possibilities, one must consistently
encourage far-reaching discussion with clients to gather and confirm
needed information, rather than relying on assumptions or
projections. 170
A key insight embodied in such an approach is the recognition
of the centrality of fostering an embracing curiosity about ourselves
and others - a curiosity that engenders probing, genuine interest in
how culture shapes each of us and in how each of us expresses our
individuality, often in opposition to our culture(s). Such a deeply
internalized, genuine, and generous curiosity about ourselves and
others is essential. For at its best and its root, cross-cultural
competence is a matter not simply of the mind to be learned from a
book, but a matter of the heart and the spirit to be experienced in
thoroughgoing (and mutual) connection and engagement with
others.

II. A Sketch of a Future Agenda
Just as the textbooks omit some key insights of the larger crosscultural lawyering literature, that literature itself has failed to cover
several important topics that warrant more detailed exploration. As
elaborated below, those of us interested in enhancing studentlawyers' cross-cultural skills would do well to focus more closely on
the cultural aspects of socioeconomic class, on the latest studies of
168. Bryant, supra note 3, at 42. This possibility is one of the reasons behind the call for
students to identify elements of cultural similarity and difference between them and
their clients. L6pez's description of his fictionalized impact litigator, "Teresa," is an
example of this phenomenon. See supra note 89.
169. Bryant insightfully observes:
Lawyers usually ask questions based on differences that they perceive between
themselves and their clients. Thus, lawyers tend to ask questions when clients
make choices that the lawyers would not have made or when the lawyers
perceive an inconsistency between what the clients are saying and doing.
Lawyers tend not to ask questions about choices that clients have made when
the lawyers would have made the same choices; in such a situation, the lawyer
usually assumes that the clients' thought processes and reasoning are the same
as his or her own.
Bryant, supra note 3, at 66 (footnote omitted).
170. Bryant, for example, shares the advice of cross-cultural trainers "to ask 'I wonder
if there is another piece of information that, if I had it, would help me interpret what is
going on?"' Id. at 72 (quoting RICHARD BRISLIN & TOMOKO YOSHIDA, INTERCULTURAL
COMMUNICATION TRAINING: AN INTRODUCTION (1994)).
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social cognition and subconscious social attitudes, and on the
interaction of lawyers' professional socialization and prevailing
stereotypes of low-income and working-class people.
A. More Explicit Focus on Socioeconomic Class
One realm of potential difference between lawyers and clients
that has not yet received the concentrated attention it warrants is
socio-economic class and its cultural impact. Such a failure is
consistent, of course, with the widespread refusal in the U.S. to
scrutinize class - a continuation of longstanding notions of
"American exceptionalism" to the import and intractability of
class.171 In the cross-cultural lawyering literature, while class is often
listed with race and gender as one of the three central dimensions of
difference in the U.S., it is rarely discussed directly; it tends instead
to be tacitly subsumed under race. 172 (Such an approach is prone to
overlook people of color who are affluent or professional middleclass, Whites who are low-income or working-class, and the
significance of class distinctions among people of the same race).
Without discounting the importance of its intersectionality with
race, and gender, class alone warrants greater attention. 173
Indeed, the lack of clearly established terminology to even
identify the major classes in U.S. society is an indication of how
much work remains to be done in this area. For purposes of this
essay, I will use a taxonomy adapted from the work of Betsy
Leondar-Wright. 174 She describes a four-class hierarchy. At the
bottom are the low-income working poor, who struggle, often
unsuccessfully, to meet minimal subsistence needs and to maintain
steady work. 175 Above the working poor is the working class, whose
171. See generally SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE(1997); DEBORAH L. MADSEN, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM (1998).
172. Krieger and Neumann list class as one of many potential sources of culture
(which they define as a shared "body of values, customs, and ways of looking at the
EDGED SWORD

world"), but do not explore it further. See KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING

SKILLS II, supra note 5, at 49. Cochran, DiPippa, and Peters refer to class specifically
twice. See COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 206, 210-11.
173. As Michael Zweig notes: "[N]o meaning of class is fully independent of race and
gender, because a person's experience of class position depends on the person's race,
ethnicity, and gender. At the same time, ... an appreciation of class can illuminate some
of the complexities of racial and gender experience." Zweig, supra note 121, at 2-3.
174. See BETSY LEONDAR-WRIGHT, CLASS MATTERS: CROSS-CLASS ALLIANCE BUILDING
FOR MIDDLE-CLASS ACIVISTS (2005).
175. See id. at 1-2. Leondar-Wright refers to this as the "poverty class," a term I prefer
to avoid. Because of the unwieldiness of my alternative term, I will hereafter refer to this
class interchangeably as either low-income or working-poor.
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members perform physical labor and/or have little control of their
workplace environment, have little or no college education, and low
or negative net worth. 176 Above the working class (and the lower
middle class that she subsumes within it),177 is the professional
middle class, populated by college- or graduate-school educated,
salaried professionals or managers, who have autonomy over their
work environment and often authority over subordinates, as well as
1 78
the status and connections to help their children stay in this class.
Above the professional middle class is the owning class, whose
members need not work because of their investment income. 179
Given the class backgrounds of their clients - most of whom
tend to be low-income or working-class - students in law school
clinics and lawyers who aspire to effecting progressive social change
can benefit from specific examination of class-linked cultural
patterns and the dynamics of cross-class interaction. To be sure,
many clinical programs use readings and exercises to try to ensure
that students are aware of the circumstances in which working-poor
and working-class clients live. 180 Such devices are important to help
foster empathy. But it is also important to explore the role that
people's economic circumstances and ensuing life experiences play
in shaping their culture - i.e., their approaches to understanding and
acting in the world.
In urging attention to class culture, I do not imply that anyone
is completely shaped or described by such culture. We each are
constantly evolving products of a multitude of experiences that
need to be explored, not presumed. Nor do I assume that all lawyers
come from professional-middle-class backgrounds. Indeed, it is in
176. See id. at 1.
177. Leondar-Wright includes the lower middle class as a sub-class of the working
class, because even though members of the former may be more economically secure
and comfortable, they tend to share with the working class the lack of 4-year college
degrees "and/or less control over their work and/or fewer assets than professional
middle-class families. If they own a small business, it can only survive by the
proprietor's hands-on work." Id.
178. See id. at 2.
179. See id.
180. In the Civil Justice Clinic, for example, we assign excerpts from BARBARA
EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA (2001); JONATHAN

KOZOL, RACHEL AND HER CHILDREN (1988); Katherine Boo, After Welfare, THE NEW
YORKER (Apr. 9, 2001); Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over": Power, Resistance and the

Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
Many clinics assign a budgeting exercise to help some students appreciate the
challenge of meeting family necessities at low-income and working-class wage rates. See,
e.g., Juliet M. Brodie, Post-Welfare Lawyering: Clinical Legal Education and a New Poverty
Law Agenda, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 201, 233-35 (2006); Fran Quigley, Seizing The
Disorienting Moment: Adult Learning Theory and the Teaching of Social Justice in Law School
Clinics, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 37, 68 n.105 (1995).
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part because many students come from working-poor or workingclass families, but are being socialized into the professional middle
class, that direct attention to issues of class culture is so
important.1 81
I believe an examination of cultural differences between the
working poor, working class, and professional middle class would
benefit students and lawyers navigating cross-class interactions.
Like the rest of the cross-cultural domain, such an exploration, to be
fully effective, will entail not only learning about other class
cultures, but also about how to recognize and reflect on one's own
class-linked socialization. "Law and society" theorists have
discussed some aspects of the class culture of low-income people,
particularly with regard to their attitudes toward law and
lawyers. 182 "Working-class studies" is on the upswing. 183 Analysts
have studied the professional middle class.18 4 And a number of
recent works have examined what they refer to as "the class divide"
between professional-middle-class activists (and service providers)
and the working poor and working class.1 85 It is time to identify and
integrate the best of these works on class culture into our teaching
and scholarship on cross-cultural lawyering.
I write to urge such an inquiry, not to report the results of
having completed it; but I can posit a few of the beneficial
explorations it might encourage. Attention to class cultures might,
for example, prime students to explore whether U.S. culture (and
particularly White U.S. culture) is as extremely and uniformly
individualistic as it is often depicted. Is such a generalization more
likely to be true of professional-middle-class people than of lowincome or working-class people? Do we tend to differ in class-linked
ways in the extent to which we are rooted in local community, value

181. For a powerful exploration of the challenges and pain of "crossing over" from
the working class to the professional middle class, see Barbara Jensen, Across the Class

Divide: Crossing Classes and Clashing Cultures, in ZWEIG, supra note 121, at 168. See also
JOANNA KADI, THINKING CLASS: SKETCHES FROM A CULTURAL WORKER (1996).
182. See, e.g., Sarat, supra note 180.
183. See, e.g., NEW WORKING-CLASS STUDIES, supra note 121; Center for Study of
Working Class Life at SUNY Stonybrook, https://naples.cc.sunysb.edu/CAS/wcm.nsf
(last visited Sep. 16, 2006); The Center for Working Class Studies at Youngstown State
University, http://www.as.ysu.edu/-cwcs/ (last visited Sep. 16, 2006).
184. See, e.g., BARBARA EHRENREICH, FEAR OF FALLING: THE INNER LIFE OF THE MIDDLE
CLASS (1989); Barbara Ehrenreich & John Ehrenreich, The ProfessionalManagerial Class, in
BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL 5 (Pat Walker ed. 1979).
185. See, e.g., DAVID CROTEAU, POLITICS AND THE CLASS DIVIDE: WORKING PEOPLE
AND THE MIDDLE-CLASS LEFT (1995); LEONDAR-WRIGHT, supra note 174; FRED ROSE,
COALITIONS ACROSS THE CLASS DIVIDE: LESSONS FROM THE LABOR, PEACE, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENTS (2000); LINDA STOUT, BRIDGING THE CLASS DIVIDE: AND
OTHER LESSONS FOR GRASSROOTs ORGANIZING (1996); Jensen, supra note 181.
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close family ties, and/or prioritize connection and loyalty to those
we consider our own? 186 Do most of us in the U.S. share an
expectation that our needs and desires can and should be met? That
we can and should insist on it? Is this sense of "entitlement" less
readily shared by low-income or working-class people1 87 Is there a
professional-middle-class tendency to view low-income and
working-class people as unaware and in need of education and
information about social issues or rights?1 88 Might what outsiders
perceive as acquiescence to the status quo flow not from ignorance,
but from a pragmatic calculation, grounded in part in one's
economic circumstances, of the likelihood of defeat and/or the
ability to withstand retaliation? 8 9 To put these and other questions
on lawyers' agendas for inquiry, the cross-cultural lawyering
literature needs to focus more concentrated attention on
socioeconomic class and the cultural differences it may engender.
B. Addressing the Latest Research on the Social Cognition of
Bias
Each of the clinical textbooks on interviewing and counseling
discussed above caution against the danger of stereotyping, which
they implicitly treat as an issue of what we choose to believe about
groups of "others." 19 Neither these texts, nor the cross-cultural
186. For an argument that there is a class difference between the working-class and
the professional middle class in this regard, see ROSE, supra note 185, at 67, 73
(contrasting middle class, which "teaches its children individualism and a focus on
personal development to prepare them for professional work" and encourages
internalization of a "striving to accomplish, so that personal self-worth depends on their
ability to perform at work" with working class, for whom "[i]dentity comes from being
accepted and known, so that stable friendships and work relationships are important.
These relations with family members, peers in school and work, and neighbors tend to
be inherited in working-class communities.")
187. For an argument that the sense of "entitlement" is a trait of the middle class that
the working class and working poor typically do not share, see CROTEAU, supra note 185,
at 140-42 (citing Robert Coles, Entitlement, ATLANTIC 52 (Sept 1977); MARK KANN,
MIDDLE CLASS RADICALISM IN SANTA MONICA 279-80 (1986)).
188. David Croteau contends that professional middle class activists tend to assume incorrectly - that working-class people lack not just education and information about
social problems, but even awareness of such problems. CROTEAU, supra note 185, at 14860.
189. See Piomelli, Foucault'sApproach to Power, supra note 11, at 472-73.
190. For example, Lawyers as Counselors, in noting the risks of stereotyping in efforts to
bridge cross-cultural differences, characterizes stereotypes as assumptions "that you
may make" about others. See BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5, at
33. Essential Lawyering Skills discusses stereotyping as the application of oversimplified
and exaggerated cultural characteristics to all members of a group; it casts "showing
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lawyering literature generally, have, however, fully explored the
burgeoning research of cognitive scientists on "the social cognition
of bias." 191 That research has begun to document the extent and
influence of "implicit" (or "automatic") biases in how we think
about, feel toward, and treat members of other groups (as well as
our own groups) - biases which our minds deploy without our even
1 92
being conscious or aware.
Legal academics Jerry Kang 193 and Gary Blasi1 94 have reported
extensively on the latest cognitive research on bias.1 95 This literature
often distinguishes between two forms of bias: stereotypes, which
are beliefs about or traits associated with a social category, and
prejudice, which is an attitude or feeling (negative or positive)
toward a group. 196 Kang has largely directed his work at how one
might craft policy in light of the research; 197 Blasi has focused more
respect for a culture" by trying to understand it in all its complexity as the opposite of
stereotyping. See KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS II, supra note 5, at
52-53. The Counselor-at-Law characterizes stereotyping as "attributing group preferences
to individuals." See COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5,at 219.
191. Carwina Weng has advocated teaching basic cognitive psychology to students
(to reassure them that they need not feel defensive about having stereotypes) and
discussed the prevalence of mental schemas (or scripts) and their often unconscious
application. See Weng, supra note 3, at 391-96. However she has not extensively
discussed the experimental research described infra at notes 192-214 and accompanying
text.
192. For introductions to and summaries of the field, see ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL
COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE (1999); GORDON B. MOSKOWITZ, SOCIAL
COGNITION: UNDERSTANDING SELF AND OTHERS (2004). Kunda defines automatic

processes as those that occur outside awareness, without intention, are uncontrollable
once begun, and require few cognitive resources (so that people can be thinking about or
doing other things simultaneously). See KUNDA, supra, at 256. She notes that many
cognitive processes are "automatic in some regards but controllable in others." Id. at 257.
193. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (2005). See also Jerry
Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REV 1130, 1138-46 (2000); Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmative Action", 94 CALIF. L.
REV. 1063 (2006). For one of the earliest discussions of social cognition research in the
legal literature, see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive
Bias Approach to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1186-1217 (1995). For an earlier argument, based in Freudian psychology, on the
unconsciousness of much modern racism, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
194. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons From Cognitive Social
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002)
195. See also Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Symposium on
BehavioralRealism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945 (2006).
196. See, e.g., MOSKOWITZ, supra note 192, at 444; Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra
note 193, at 1500.
197. Thus in Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, Kang argued that the FCC should
not use hours of local news coverage as an indicator of a broadcaster's operation in the
public interest, because local news' coverage of crime stories fuels implicit bias against
Blacks and Latinos. See also Kang, supra note 193, at 1536-37 (outlining areas of law that
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on how one might best advocate against stereotypes that others
hold.198 Neither have focused as intently as the cross-cultural lawyer
must on what the research might tell us about how to renounce or
work around the biases that we ourselves may hold so that we can
interact effectively with clients across dimensions of difference.199
The social cognition literature on bias warrants detailed
exploration. Using a variety of experimental methods, cognitive
scientists have exposed a significant divergence between our reports
- to others and to ourselves - of our attitudes toward outsiders and
the subconscious operations of our minds. Perhaps the best known
of these experimental devices is the Implicit Association Test (IAT),
which measures implicit attitudes toward or associations with a
20
range of social categories. 200 The IAT, which is available online, '
and highly worth the time to take, reveals widespread implicit bias
against many social groups, including the elderly, Blacks, Latinos,
Asians, Arab-Muslims, and gays and lesbians. 202 Those findings of
implicit or automatic bias often conflict with the self-reported
attitudes and beliefs of the test-takers. 20 3 Indeed, results sometimes
reveal implicit bias against groups to which subjects themselves
belong.204
Experiments reveal powerful impacts of implicit bias on how
we interpret or evaluate others, how we interact with others, and
how we ourselves perform. I hope that sharing a few of the most
might be informed and revised by social cognition research). In FairMeasures, supra note

193, Kang and his co-author deploy the research findings on implicit social cognition to
reframe affirmative action as a response to current, not just past, discrimination.
198. See Blasi, supra note 194.
199. Jody Armour, also focusing on how to reach others, has argued that conscious or
controlled processes are "the key to escaping unconscious discrimination" by activating
non-prejudiced or egalitarian personal beliefs. See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice:
Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV 733, 738 (1995).
Kang has also begun to address "debiasing" techniques. See Kang & Banaji, supra note

193.
200. See Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464 (1998).

For a concise explanation in the legal literature of the IAT, see Michael S. Shin, Comment:
Redressing Wounds: Findinga Legal Framework to Remedy Racial Disparities in Medical Care,

90 CAL. L. REV. 2047, 2066-68 (2002).
201. See
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/measureyourattitudes.html
(last visited Sep. 16, 2006).
202. See Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism,and Their
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 Soc. JUST. RES. 143, 146-47 (2004), cited in Kang, Trojan

Horses of Race, supra note 193, at 1512 n.104; Antony Page, Batson's Blind-Spot:
Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U.L. REV. 155, 238 n.418

(2005).
203. See Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at 1512-13.
204. For example, approximately half of Blacks show anti-Black bias on the IAT. See
Kang & Banaji, supra note 193.
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intriguing results will suffice to encourage lawyers and theorists
interested in cross-cultural interactions to explore the literature in
greater depth. For example: People who solve puzzles with a few
words that subconsciously evoke concepts linked with the elderly
actually walk more slowly after the testing. 205 People subliminally
shown Black faces before a computer crashes get angrier at the crash
than those subliminally shown White faces. 206 Asian women
subconsciously primed to emphasize their Asian identity do better
on a hard math test, and those primed to focus on their female
20 7
identity do worse, than those who receive neither priming.
African Americans told that a challenging test they are taking is
ability diagnostic do significantly worse than equally talented White
students, a performance drop that disappears when the test is
described as a non-diagnostic, problem-solving exercise. 208 Studies
also seem to show that implicit bias (identified, for example, by the
IAT) may often "leak out," particularly into non-verbal aspects of
interactions. 209 Kang likens the pervasive, subconscious operation of
biases to a Trojan Horse computer virus that operates
surreptitiously, without the user's knowledge, to alter210operations in
ways the user would reject if she were aware of them.
To be sure, studies do show that these automatic processes can
potentially be overridden - if a person has the appropriate
awareness, motivation, and ability to do so. 211 But researchers stress
how difficult it can be to achieve and maintain all three of these
prerequisites. 212 A number of experiments also indicate there is a
205. See Blasi, supra note 194, at 1247-48 (citing John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of
Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 236-38 (1996)).

206. See Blasi, supra note 194, at 1248; Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at
1491 (citing Bargh et al., supra note 205, at 238-39).
207. See Blasi, supra note 194, at 1249; Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at
1492-93, each citing Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and
Shifts in Quantitative Performance,10 J. PSYCHOL. SCI. 80 (1999).
208. See Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity
and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 613 (1997); Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson,
Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). For a particularly accessible summary by
Steele of his and his colleagues' work on "stereotype threat," see Claude M. Steele, Expert
Report of Claude M. Steele, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 439 (1999) (expert testimony in Gratz v.

Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
209. See, e.g., Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at 1523-25; Kang & Banaji,
supra note 193. See also MOSKOWITZ, supra note 192, at 450.
210. See Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at 1554.
211. See, e.g., MOSKOWITz, supra note 192, at 493; Blasi, supra note 194, at 1252-54;
Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at 1529-30.
212. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 194, at 1253 (citing John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster:
The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effect, in DUAL PROCESS
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strong possibility of a rebound effect, in which a short-term
suppression or rejection of stereotyping leads to more stereotyping
later. 213 Other research indicates that our emotional state and level
of self-esteem plays a significant role in the likelihood of applying
21 4
negative stereotypes.
The literature on cross-cultural lawyering would do well to
address in depth this research on social cognition and implicit bias.
Can cross-cultural theorists' emphasis on introspection and cultural
self-awareness be reconciled with cognitive scientists' findings on
the automatic nature of much stereotyping? Are lawyering theorists'
suggestions for cross-cultural competency consistent with social
cognitionists' findings on debiasing strategies? The answers to these
questions deserve explicit, detailed attention.
C. Articulating Stereotypes of Low-Income and Working-Class
Clients and Attending to Their Interplay with Lawyer
Socialization
A possible implication of social cognition research on implicit
bias may be to suggest the importance of explicitly exploring
prevalent stereotypes, even those we consciously disavow. There
may be value to openly discussing the traits and associations often
linked to cultural ingroups and outgroups, for those images may
well be operating in our minds - or in the minds of clients, factfinders, and others. (Of course, there may be costs too, in terms of
mapping additional meanings that we may not have previously
attached or of possibly reinforcing associations and heightening
their accessibility in our minds. 215) The potential value of
articulating stereotypes is another issue that the texts and/or
general clinical literature on cross-cultural lawyering might
beneficially address.
Linking this idea of discussing "the elephant in the room" - i.e.,
the specific content of stereotypes - with the suggestion above of the
importance of class cultures, 216 it might be helpful, for example, to
articulate prevalent stereotypes of the working class. In the U.S.,
those stereotypes or associations might include notions that

THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361, 376 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds. 1999));
Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at 1529-31.
213. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 192, at 343-46; MOSKOWITZ, supra note 192, at 499-501;
Blasi, supra note 194, at 1253-54; Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, supra note 193, at 1530 n.213.
214. See, e.g., KUNDA, supra note 192, at 259-62; Blasi, supra note 194, at 1250-52.
215. See MOSKOWITZ, supra note 192, at 499-501.

216. See supra notes 171-89 and accompanying text.
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working-class people tend to be:
" unintelligent;
* inarticulate;
* unable to recognize their real self-interest;
" lacking in judgment and decision-making skills;
" quick to anger, hostility, or violence;
* prone to bigotry (such as racism, sexism, and/or
homophobia);
" attracted to and/or accepting of authoritarianism (especially
in the family and political spheres);
* lacking in initiative and prone to fatalism; or
217
* inflexible and afraid of change.
As ugly as the task can feel, bringing the contents of stereotypes
into the open may suggest a number of remedial measures. It could,
for example, encourage lawyers to more carefully consider - using
controlled rather than implicit processes 218 - how closely our
reactions to or assessments of a client dovetail with the stereotype.
To the extent that elements of stereotypes revolve around imputed
lack of intelligence, it might lead us to explicitly consider what we
mean by intelligence - perhaps by introducing the concept of
multiple intelligences 219 - and to directly address just how close to a
meritocracy we actually consider our society. 220 It might also
suggest the value of exposing lawyers to counter-exemplars of
demonstrate
clearly
who
members
group
stereotyped
221
intelligence.
217. See, e.g., CROTEAU, supra note 185; EHRENREICH, supra note 184; KADI, supra note
181; LEONDAR-WRIGHT, supra note 174; ROSE, supra note 185. Many of these images can
be traced back to mid-twentieth century U.S. sociologists' purportedly objective
assessments of the working-class. See, e.g., SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN:
THE SOCIAL BASES OF POLITICS 87-126 (rev. ed. 1981) (1960) (chapter on "working-class

authoritarianism).
218. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
219. Howard Gardner coined the term to reflect his understanding of intelligence not
as a single faculty, but as numerous different abilities. See HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES
OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (10th Anniversary ed., 1993) (1983)
(describing seven intelligences). See also Angela Olivia Burton, Cultivating Ethical, Socially
Responsible Lawyer Judgment: Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm into
the Clinical Setting, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 15 (2004) (describing linguistic, categorizing,
logical-mathematical, narrative, intrapersonal, interpersonal, and strategic intelligences
as key capacities for lawyering).
220. See, e.g., STEVEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, THE MERITOCRACY MYTH
(2004); Rebecca Parrish, The Meritocracy Myth: A Dollars & Sense Interview with Lani
Guinier, DOLLARS & SENSE (Jan/Feb 2006) at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/

archives/2006/0106guinier.html (last visited Sep. 16, 2006).
221. In the U.C. Hastings Civil Justice Clinic, my colleagues and I have long assigned
Lucie White's description of her representation of "Mrs. G.," in large part for its
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Similarly, it may be helpful to explore stereotypes of the
professional middle class, particularly as seen by low-income and
working-class people. Those stereotypes or associations might, for
example, include images of professional-middle-class people as:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
•

"stuck up," condescending, and elitist;
preachy, moralizing "know-it-alls";
unrealistic and out of touch with the lives of ordinary
people;
emotionally cold;
unreliable and unaccountable;
fake - feigning "tolerance" or adherence to neutral rules or
policy to mask an unwillingness to voice their true (negative)
feelings;
ruthless - unconcerned with the impacts of decisions or
actions on others; or
committed to process or form over substance.22 2

Paying attention to stereotypes of the groups to which we
belong can, of course, be painful. It can push us away from others
whom we suspect - perhaps rightfully, perhaps incorrectly, but
likely without certainty - of distorting or dismissing key aspects of
our individuality and/or our culture. It can, at times, open wounds
that lead us to despair, withdrawal, and/or anger. But awareness of
how exactly others may pigeonhole us can also help us decide
whether and how to engage with them. It can help us choose what
to confront or educate about, what to avoid or to highlight.
In addition to helping us respond to those who might
stereotype us, awareness of the content of stereotypes can also help
us decide whether we wish to try to change aspects of ourselves or
our socialization - to avoid embodying or confirming imputed traits
or behaviors that we disavow. It is in this last vein that attending to
pejorative stereotypes of the professional middle class can be
particularly useful. For those stereotypes reflect, perhaps
imperfectly, ways in which we as professionals may manifest our
depiction - at least as many of us interpret the story - of a low-income, AfricanAmerican, single mother on public assistance in North Carolina who proves to be a far
more nimble strategist and tactician than her White, Harvard-educated, legal services
attorney. See Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes:
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990).

Of course, as Blasi points out, cognitive scientists believe that rather than altering
stereotypes, counter-exemplars are likely to lead us to retain the original stereotype, and
simply to create exceptional subtypes. See Blasi, supra note 194, at 1268-69.
222. See, e.g., CROTEAU, supra note 185; KADI, supra note 181; LEONDAR-WRIGHT, supra
note 174; Sarat, supra note 180.
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class privilege; they may outline the view from the receiving end of
223
our "leaked-out" biases.
Some of the cross-cultural lawyering literature, particularly
Cochran, DiPippa, and Peters' work, has directed attention to
lawyers' professional socialization. 224 It has noted, for example,
lawyers' discomfort with expressions or discussions of emotion, our
extolling of and expectation for linear thinking, and our general
avoidance of framing problems as systemic, rather than
individual. 225 But to date, the cross-cultural literature has not
focused squarely on how attorneys' enculturation as lawyers
overlaps and interacts with prevailing stereotypes of low-income
and working-class clients.
Among the additional elements of potentially culturallyencapsulating professional socialization that Cochran and his
colleagues fail to discuss are many lawyers' tendencies:
*
*
*
*
*
*

to impose a narrow scope of relevance and to guard
vigilantly (even obsessively) against client rambling;
to harbor (and judge according to) unrealistic expectations
for client precision and recall;
to assume that clients are easily confused or mystified and
that law is too complex for them to understand;
to assume that clients come to lawyers at the end of their
wits and want lawyers to completely take over their problem
for them;
to treat the legal system's remedies as the only ones certainly the main ones - that clients desire and lawyers can
deliver; or
to see lawyering as completely distinct from lay efforts to
solve problems - so clients have little or nothing to offer
tactically or strategically and joint-problem-solving is
unrealistic.

In short, many lawyers view themselves as technically expert

223. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (on "leaked out" bias). Comparing

these two lists of stereotypes, see text supra at notes 217 and 222, reveals significant
interconnections. To the extent, for example, that professionals hold (and betray) images

of working-class people as unintelligent, inarticulate, unaware of their real self-interest,
lacking in judgment or initiative, it is not surprising to see that the targets of such
stereotypes might in turn view those professionals as condescending, preachy,
moralizing, cold, and fake, know-it-alls.
224. See COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW I, supra note 5; COCHRAN ET AL.,
THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5. See also Bryant, supra note 3, at 40, 68-70, 84-85.
225. See COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5, at 211-12, 215. See
also supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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guardians or saviors of the interests of clients, whom they see or
treat as unable to help themselves. Those familiar with Gerald
L6pez's work will recognize many of these elements of professional
socialization as aspects of what he labeled the "regnant" (or
226
reigning) vision of lawyering.
To professional-middle-class clients, being on the receiving end
of these assumptions can be off-putting. But unless these clients are
also members of other subordinated groups stereotyped as
unintelligent, ineffective, or irrational, exposure to these attitudes is
unlikely to feel like a repeatedly encountered experience. In fact, it is
likely to rankle precisely because it is not the way such clients are
generally treated in their lives.
For low-income and working-class clients (and members of
other marginalized groups), many of these assumptions about
clients - as rambling, imprecise, defeated, confused, mystified, and
helpless, for example - likely echo elements of prevailing
stereotypes they encounter daily. 227 Encountering such stereotypes
from their lawyers is likely to destroy the rapport, trust, and
engagement essential to a successful relationship. Attorneys'
betrayal, whether conscious or not, of such attitudes threatens, in
turn, to trigger from working-class and working-poor clients
disparaging counter-stereotypes of middle-class professionals. The
clash of such stereotypes inevitably dashes the possibility of
successful work together.
Although they have not previously been framed in this light,
many of the recommendations of advocates of "rebellious" or
"collaborative" lawyering can be understood, in significant part, as
a call to progressive lawyers to recognize and break out of deeply
ingrained but counterproductive cultural patterns likely to result
from their class and their professional socialization. 228 Only by
recognizing and rejecting key aspects of class and professional
socialization are lawyers likely to truly treat low-income, workingclass, and other clients from marginalized social groups as partners
in joint efforts to make social change.
Conclusion
The one-size-fits-all, culture-blind approach to teaching
interviewing and counseling is thankfully now a relic of the past.
Although I have criticized aspects of the new edition of Lawyers as
226. See LOPEZ, supra note 89, at 23-29.
227. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.

228. See works cited supra at note 144.
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Counselors'22 9 approach to the issue, I appreciate that it has tackled
the subject and recognize the difficulty of the task. I have sought to
highlight two less-frequently discussed texts, Essential Lawyering
Skills23 and The Counselor-at-Law, 231 that have materially advanced
the cause. These texts, and the larger clinical literature on crosscultural lawyering, have in the past decade significantly improved
the odds that new lawyers will be alert to such issues and better
equipped to address them.
Of course, as this essay has sketched, there is more work to be
done. I hope we will make comparable advances in the next decade
in preparing lawyers to explore potentially class-linked crosscultural issues, to understand the insights that social cognition
research sheds on the operation and overcoming of bias, and to
challenge tacit assumptions about lower-income and working-class
clients inculcated by lawyers' class and professional socialization.
To make good on any of these cross-cultural aspirations, texts
and articles cannot be read as recipes for how to understand and
manage others adeptly. They must be read, and their suggestions
internalized, as a fundamental commitment to learn with and from
others about how we can connect effectively to change our world.
Enhancing our cross-cultural competence is not about cataloguing
what we think we already know about ourselves and others, so
much as it is about emphasizing what we still and always must
learn.

229. BINDER ET AL., LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS II, supra note 5.
230. KRIEGER & NEUMANN, ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 11, supra note 5.
231. COCHRAN ET AL., THE COUNSELOR-AT-LAW II, supra note 5.
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